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Preface 
Following tender in 2004, NUPI (the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs), Department of International Economics, was asked by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to undertake an assessment of 
Norway’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for imports from 
developing countries. About the background and terms of reference, see 
Appendix A.  
This main report, which is published simultaneously in English and 
Norwegian, provides a comprehensive review of the GSP system, 
including options for change. In addition, five background papers analyse 
in more depth selected issues that are important for the conclusions (see 
titles on cover page).  
As part of the project, we have interviewed a number of parties 
involved: 
− Staff in multilateral organisations such as UNCTAD and the WTO. 
− Representatives of developing countries. 
− Norwegian Customs and Excise. 
− 27 Norwegian importers. 
In Appendix B, a list of interviewees is presented. The Norwegian 
importers were interviewed with the premise of anonymity, and their 
names are not included. These interviews were mainly for firms in the 
field of food and agriculture. We thank all the interviewees for spending 
their time and sharing their knowledge and experience with us.  
We have also been in contract with and received information from 
other parties involved, e.g. the EU Commission, the World Bank, 
Statistics Norway, the Norwegian Agricultural Authority and Norwegian 
Customs and Excise (in addition to the interview). We thank all those who 
have provided information or shared their views and knowledge with us. 
Kyrre Stensnes worked as a research assistant to undertake interviews 
with importers, and has written Appendix F in the Norwegian version of 
this report, with a summary of these interviews. Stensnes has also 
contributed to the translation of this report. We thank him for his effort. 
We thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the financial support for 
the project, and for the constructive and good cooperation along the way. 
We have also appreciated that the Ministry has provided full independence 
in terms of the analysis undertaken and the policy recommendations 
provided. We thank the Norwegian Delegation in Geneva for assistance 
related to meetings. 
The views expressed are those of the authors only. The responsibility 
for remaining errors rests on us.  
 
Oslo, 22 August 2005. 
 
Arne Melchior    Per Botolf Maurseth 
Project Manager   Head of Department 
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Summary of main conclusions 
 
For manufactured goods, market access for developing countries in 
Norway has improved considerably during the last decade, due to general 
tariff cuts as well as improvements in the tariff preferences for developing 
countries (GSP, the Generalized System of Preferences). For 
manufactured goods, tariffs for GSP beneficiaries now remain only for 80 
out of more than 6000 tariff lines. Twenty years ago, suppliers of e.g. 
clothing in Western Europe had zero tariffs and a tariff advantage of 
around 20% compared to developing countries. This advantage is now 
reduced to 2-4% on average. This improvement in market access has been 
accompanied by considerably increased imports from developing 
countries; with the largest expansion by China. 
While Norway currently has one of the most liberal import regimes for 
manufacturing in the OECD, the pattern is diametrically opposed in 
agriculture. Our calculations indicate that 28% of the applied tariffs for 
agricultural products in Norway are above 100%, and the simple tariff 
average is close to 100%. Developing countries obtain a modest 10-15% 
tariff rebate under GSP. Tariffs are on average somewhat lower for 
products exported by developing countries, but on the whole, protection in 
agriculture remains high also for developing countries.  
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have zero tariffs with no 
quantitative restrictions for all goods including agriculture. The evidence 
shows that the costs of initiating trade with LDCs are higher and 
frequently prohibitive; hence little imports have been generated even in 
cases where LDCs have tariff preferences at several hundred per cent. 
Some success stories exist, however: Imports of clothing from 
Bangladesh, flowers from Africa and some feedstuff have increased due to 
GSP. Botswana and Namibia are treated almost as LDCs even if they are 
middle-income countries, and imports of meat from these countries have 
been allowed under special quotas.  
For manufacturing, the report recommends that tariffs be reduced to 
zero on an MFN basis; i.e. for all countries. Such a reform implies that the 
control of the origin of goods is no longer required, and this implies a 
significant simplification and cost reduction. This is important for 
developing countries, and especially the small ones. Small countries that 
do not have their own production of fabrics and yarn, may currently 
frequently not use GSP for clothing due to the rules of origin. 
For agriculture, complete free trade is not on the current agenda and 
the report discussed a GSP model where tariff reductions are differentiated 
according to country and product groups. 
Under the WTO, discrimination between developing countries beyond 
LDCs is possible only if this is based on objective criteria. We suggest that 
differentiation with three different tiers of developing countries. The 
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poorest group, receiving the most generous tariff reductions,  should 
include more than the LDCs. This is motivated by 
- the fact than more than 4/5 of the world’s poor live outside the LDCs, 
and the latter constitute a small share of the developing world  
- the wish to provide market access to countries with a larger supply 
capacity  
- the wish to sustain broader competition and thereby avoiding that GSP 
generates non-sustainable trade that does not survive when other 
suppliers obtain better market access 
- to soften the impact of thresholds between country groups that are to 
some extent arbitrary 
- to avoid future problems of “preference erosion”, with the possible 
implication that countries with mega-preferences delay improvements 
in market access for other developing countries. 
We therefore suggest that the poorest group should be widened beyond the 
LDCs, to include other low-income countries. At the other end, the report 
suggests that high-income countries are “graduated” and lose their GSP 
benefits.  
It is therefore suggested that GSP beneficiaries are grouped in three 
tiers, mainly corresponding to low income, lower middle income and 
upper middle income. The “second poorest” countries also need market 
access in support of development and poverty reduction. Meaningful tariff 
preferences should therefore also be granted to lower middle income 
countries such as China and Brazil.  
For the Norwegian GSP system, this would imply that some richer 
countries such as Korea and Hong Kong are graduated from GSP, that 
Russia and other countries in the former Soviet Union are given GSP, and 
that Botswana and Namibia are treated along with other countries at their 
respective income levels (upper, lower middle income). For some of the 
affected countries (Korea, Botswana, Namibia), EFTA is currently 
negotiating free trade agreements that may regulate future trade. For 
countries that do not export agricultural goods, market access for goods 
will be secured via zero MFN tariffs for manufactures. 
For agriculture, we suggest that the poorest group should obtain zero 
tariffs for all products. The upper middle income countries should face ad 
valorem rather than specific tariffs, and tariffs should be reduced in order 
to eliminate the “water in the tariffs”. The GSP system should to the 
largest extent possible be based on ad valorem tariffs rather than specific 
tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs). 
For the intermediate group of developing countries, GSP tariff 
reductions should be scaled across products. A main criterion should be 
the importance of different products for developing countries and the 
trade-creating impact of tariff cuts. The study indicates that in agriculture, 
the scope for increased imports from developing countries is largest for (i) 
feedstuff, (ii) meat, and (iii) selectively other products such as e.g. 
preserved or frozen vegetables, or some processed food. More detail is 
provided in the study.  
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More liberal imports of feedstuff and meat will have a significant 
impact on Norwegian agricultural production, and the scale of 
liberalisation is a political decision. Imports of feedstuff could have a 
positive impact on agriculture except grain production by cutting costs 
significantly. It will however affect grain production negatively, and GSP 
reforms could be phased in gradually. 
The study recommends that in agriculture, the use of TRQs is 
eliminated or at least reduced over time. If TRQs are “successful” so that 
prices are bid up, they signify a new form of taxation of imports. Hence ad 
valorem tariff reductions should be the preferred form of GSP, although 
TRQs could be used if necessary in order to secure a gradual increase in 
market access. Reforms in GSP have to be considered in the light of WTO 
negotiations, where we do not yet know the results. 
In order to increase the benefits of GSP for developing countries, the 
study recommends that efforts should be made to increase transparency 
and predictability of the system, for example by better information and 
less use of tariff suspensions or tariffs that vary over time. There is also a 
need to increase competition among importers in some fields of 
agriculture, and this is implicitly addressed in the proposals concerning 
wider country groups and the use of ad valorem tariffs rather than TRQs.  
With tariffs that vary across countries, there is a motive for trade 
deflection, or cheating with declarations of origin. Importers may also 
classify goods erroneously in order to avoid tariffs. We discuss possible 
statistical methods to detect such practices, as a basis for the control 
activity.  
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Introduction  
 
1. GSP , SDT, MFN, WTO…?1 
 
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is one of the main tools for 
providing better treatment of developing countries in the world trade 
system. In the trade-technical language, such trade advantages are called 
Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). Under GSP, members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) are allowed to reduce tariffs for 
developing countries below the normal rates. Hence if e.g. there is a 10% 
tariff for imports from the USA, the tariff for developing countries may be 
zero. GSP therefore violates the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle 
of the WTO, which says that different trade partners should have equal 
treatment. This violation is however accepted in the WTO rules.  
While GSP is legal according to WTO rules, it is unilateral – i.e. 
granted by donor countries but not negotiated with the recipients. While 
GSP has to adhere to some guidelines set by the WTO, donors are free to 
define the country and product coverage as well as the terms. A 
consequence is also that donors may change or withdraw concessions 
under GSP.  
 
2. Norway’s GSP system has improved radically for textiles, but is still 
limited for agriculture. 
 
As one of the first countries, Norway established its GSP system in 1971, 
with comparatively generous tariff reductions for most manufactured 
goods. For the “sensitive” imports of textiles and clothing, however, tariff 
reductions under GSP were much more limited. Since clothing is one of 
the most important sectors in the exports of developing countries, this 
exception seriously limited the advantages of GSP. Textile imports from 
developing countries were also limited by quotas, which were quite 
restrictive during the 1980s. From 1986 onwards, quotas were gradually 
lifted until the last one disappeared in 2001. During the last decade, GSP 
for textiles and clothing has also radically improved; and free trade for 
clothing is now in sight. 
Another “sensitive” product group is agriculture. For agriculture, 1995 
was a watershed due to the “tariffication” agreed in the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations that established the WTO. Before 1995, trade protection 
in agriculture largely rested on quantitative restrictions, but from 1995, 
these were replaced by tariffs. While tariffs are low for some tropical 
goods and items not produced in Norway, they are very high for other 
                                                 
1 In Appendix E, a list of abbreviations is available. 
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products. After 1995, the GSP system was revised to match the new tariff 
system, but for ordinary developing countries, tariff cuts under GSP have 
been modest. Norway is one of the OECD countries with highest 
protection in agriculture, and a core issue is whether this policy is to be 
continued. 
In Appendix C, a brief chronology of the Norwegian GSP system is 
presented, and a brief reference to some earlier studies. 
 
3. The Least Developed Countries face no tariffs at all, but few of them 
are able to exploit this advantage. 
 
Under the GSP system, it is allowed to provide even better treatment for 
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), compared to ordinary developing 
countries. The LDCs obtained zero tariffs for all goods under the 
Norwegian GSP system already in 1976. Due to quantitative restrictions in 
agriculture, tariff concessions in this field were however of limited value. 
After 1995 with the new tariff system, some agricultural tariffs were re-
introduced also for LDCs. These were once more eliminated on 1 July 
2002, when the LDCs obtained zero tariffs for all goods – however subject 
to surveillance and a safeguard clause for grains and feedstuff. In general, 
however, LDCs lack capital, skills, infrastructure and technology, and they 
have only to a limited extent been able to exploit the favourable trade rules 
granted by Norway (and some other industrial countries).  
 
4. How should the GSP system be improved? 
 
This study is commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has 
asked for an assessment of the system and recommendations for future 
changes. A summary of various policy statements in this context, and 
some of the guidelines for the study, is provided in Appendix A. In 
general, the assessment is rooted in the general objective of continuously 
improving trade conditions for developing countries.  
In the current situation, an important issue is whether developing 
countries should be granted better market access in agriculture. This is a 
core issue in the current “Doha Development Agenda” round of trade 
negotiations in the WTO, and a related issue is whether such improved 
market access should be granted through GSP. A political premise set by 
the Government is however that core parts of Norwegian agriculture 
should continue to be protected. In this report, we therefore do not 
examine the option of complete agricultural liberalisation, but options for 
gradual increases in market access. 
A second issue is how to respond to the performance of LDCs, which 
have only to a limited extent been able to exploit the trade opportunities 
granted in the current system. The Ministry has explicitly asked for a 
consideration of such country differentiation under GSP. Should “LDC 
treatment” be given to more developing countries? In the study, we also 
address various administrative aspects of the GSP system.  
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5. Some conclusions are supported by background studies 
 
This main report from the GSP project contains a comprehensive 
examination of the Norwegian GSP system and concludes with policy 
recommendations. On some core themes, separate papers support the 
analysis: 
- The share of trade from developing countries is comparatively low for 
Norway, and this share is sometimes used as an indicator of trade 
openness. This is however questionable unless we correct for 
geographical factors; if you are surrounded by developing countries, 
you import more from them. Maurseth (2005a) uses a “gravity model” 
to correct for geography, and examines whether Norway’s imports 
from developing countries is high or low, internationally compared.  
- The impact of GSP depends on the relative advantage for developing 
countries compared to other suppliers. In the case of Norway, this is 
particularly important since ¾ of trade is covered by free trade 
agreements (FTAs). Melchior (2005a) examines the relative advantage 
of GSP versus free trade agreements and MFN trade rules, in a 
comparative study of the EU, USA and Norway. 
- The evaluation of GSP in agriculture is complicated by Norway’s 
extensive use of so-called specific tariffs; e.g. the tariff for bovine 
fillets is 107 NOK/kg under GSP. In order to undertake a 
comprehensive analysis of tariff levels and compare different products, 
we need to express tariffs in percentages of the import price. Such ad 
valorem equivalents (AVEs) for agriculture are calculated in Melchior 
(2005b), and used for an examination of the tariff regime. 
- Given that the issue of country differentiation under GSP is an 
important issue in the study, Melchior (2005c) examines criteria for 
differentiation, the WTO-legality of discrimination under GSP, and the 
role of different country groups for trade, development and poverty 
reduction.  
- Finally, Maurseth (2005b) examines the core issue about whether trade 
is good for economic growth and development. While it is 
unambiguously true that rich countries trade more, the causal 
relationship between trade liberalisation and growth is more mixed. An 
econometric analysis is undertaken to check e.g. whether import 
liberalisation and access to foreign markets have different implications 
for growth. 
Important conclusions from these studies are referred to throughout this 
main report, but the interested reader may find additional material in the 
studies. In addition, there are some table appendixes, e.g. more detailed 
tables on agricultural tariffs, which are not published but available upon 
request for interested readers. A more extensive analysis of the tariff 
regime for textiles is also available upon request. 
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On the impact of GSP 
 
6. After more than 30 years of GSP, its benefits are still disputed. 
 
Ever since its inception in the early 1970, the benefits of GSP have 
internationally been questioned and disputed. The main criticisms have 
been: 
- GSP is limited by exceptions and limitations for the products of 
particular interest to developing countries (se e.g. Nicolaides 1985). 
- GSP beneficiaries are frequently at a disadvantage compared to free 
trade agreements, which cover an increasing share of trade (see e.g. 
Hoekman et al. 2005). 
- The benefits of GSP are undermined by restrictive Rules of Origin 
(RO) so that countries lose their tariff advantages unless they are able 
to make the intermediate goods (e.g. textile yarn and fabrics) 
themselves (see e.g. Mattoo et al. 2003). 
- GSP benefits are undermined by other restrictions such as textile 
quotas, health and technical standards etc., that limit imports (see e.g. 
OECD 2005). 
- Due to their unilateral nature, GSP benefits are uncertain and trade are 
not willing to invest in new trades since they know that tariff 
reductions may be withdrawn (see e.g. UNCTAD 1999).  
- GSP can only work by giving some developing countries better trade 
terms than others, hence potential gains for some only come at a cost 
for others (see e.g. Nicolaides 1985). 
- A more recent critique is that due to  “rent-sharing”, a significant part 
of the tariff rebate is captured by importers in rich countries rather than 
exporters in poor countries (see e.g. Olarreaga and Özden 2005, Silva 
2005).  
Finally, there are “political economy” arguments that are derived from 
some of the former critiques: 
- Since GSP will never become generous enough for political reasons, 
developing countries should opt for multilateral trade liberalisation for 
sectors of particular interest to them, rather than GSP (Nicolaides 
1985, Hoekman et al. 2005). 
- Beneficiaries of GSP will become reluctant to multilateral trade 
liberalisation that will undermine their privileges, and this will hinder 
trade liberalisation to the benefit of other developing countries (see 
Davenport 1992, Özden and Reinhardt 2003). 
- GSP is a “lightning rod” that serves as a response to political pressure 
for better treatment of developing countries, by undertaking unilateral 
and limited improvements in market access rather than serious and 
binding concessions that will increase trade (see e.g. Melchior 2005c). 
- Since GSP is not binding and unilateral, rich countries will use GSP to 
put pressure on poor countries to give something in return (see e.g. 
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Özden and Reinhardt 2004). Poor countries should also for that reason 
opt for binding multilateral rules (see e.g. Whalley 1990). 
In spite of this massive list of criticisms against GSP, there has been 
limited conclusive evidence to settle the questions. Recently, however, 
independent research as well as work undertaken at UNCTAD, WTO and 
OECD has shed more light on the issues. 
 
7. It is a valid critique that GSP is limited, but this is not necessarily an 
argument against GSP as such. 
 
It is true that the impact of GSP is limited by country and product 
exceptions. Diagram 1, based on Melchior (2005a) shows the simple 
average of ad valorem tariffs for all products and some selected sectors in 
the GSP systems of the EU, USA and Norway:2 MFN tariffs are those that 
apply to countries that have no preferences; i.e. the “ordinary” tariffs. Here 
we consider the applied tariffs; these may be lower than the bound tariffs 
(the ones that are e.g. subject to negotiations in the WTO). 
 
Diagram 1: Limited GSP for sensitive sectors
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Agriculture
Clothing
All goods
Agriculture
Clothing
All goods
Agriculture
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Clothing and agriculture are sectors of particular interest to developing 
countries, but here tariffs are much higher than the average for all 
products, and GSP is limited. For Norway’s imports of clothing, GSP has 
been considerably improved in recent years. A few years ago, the picture 
for clothing was more similar to the pattern observed for the USA and the 
EU in the diagram, with high tariffs even under GSP.  
The diagram also serves to illustrate that agriculture is a sensitive 
sector with higher tariffs and limited GSP. In this case, however, the use 
                                                 
2 See Melchior (2005a) for data sources and details. Tariffs are for 2003 for the EU and 
Norway, and 2004 for the USA.  
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of ad valorem tariffs in the diagram underestimates the tariff level. This is 
most severe for Norway, where we shall show later that the true tariff 
average, when specific tariffs are accounted for, is close to 100% for 
Norwegian agriculture.  
For the EU and USA GSP systems, successful exporters are also hit by 
country and product “graduation”, where by GSP benefits are removed if 
they become more competitive. OECD (2005) presents a useful analysis of 
country and product graduation in agriculture, for the EU and U.S. GSP 
systems. In the EU system, country graduation is based on income level 
and the trade balance in manufacturing vs. the EU, and product graduation 
occurs if a developing country obtains a particularly high market share for 
a product. Özden and Reinhardt (2004a, b) show that if developing 
countries are no longer eligible for GSP, their export performance is 
systematically better. For this reason, they conclude, “nonreciprocal 
preference programs have failed. Developing countries would be better 
served by full integration into the reciprocity-based world trade regime”.  
While there are strong reasons for multilateral liberalisation in sectors 
of particular interest to developing countries, limitations of GSP  
nevertheless do not necessarily provide an argument against improving 
current GSP systems. An alternative implication of the limitations of GSP 
is that these limitations should be removed or reduced. In this report, we 
suggest such improvements. An alternative approach would be to say “we 
should not improve GSP, in order to push developing countries to engage 
more seriously in WTO negotiations”. We believe that concerns for 
development should override these “tactical” considerations, and that 
improvements in the Norwegian GSP system can serve development.  
 
8. Recent evidence also confirms that restrictive rules of origin (RO) 
limit the use of GSP. 
 
Rules of origin (RO) under GSP specify what kind of processing of a good 
that is required in order to obtain preferential treatment. Such rules are 
needed in order to avoid transhipment of goods in order to exploit 
preferences, or so-called “trade deflection”.3 Strict RO may limit the 
utilisation of GSP. According to some authors, strict RO constitute a 
major reason why USAs special preferences for Africa (African Growth 
and Opportunity Act, AGOA) has not yet had a stronger impact on trade 
(Mattoo et al. 2003, UNCTAD 2003), and the same is suspected for EUs 
special preferences for the LDCs (Everything But Arms, EBA) (Brenton 
2003).  
The impact of RO shows up mainly in two ways: RO implies a 
transaction cost related to certification of origin. Various estimates exist; 
frequently that the transaction cost is in the range of 2-5% of the product 
price (see e.g. Estevadeordal and Suominen 2004 for a review). In 
                                                 
3 For a technical overview, see Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004). For a discussion, see 
also Anson et al. (2003). 
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addition, strict RO may imply that cheap imported inputs have to be 
replaced with more expensive domestic inputs. According to UNCTAD 
(2003), improvements in RO are one of the main ways of improving the 
utilisation of as well as the benefits from GSP (see also Brenton and 
Manchin 2003).  
A revealing illustration of RO is the “double processing rule” for 
clothing: For knitted clothes, it is not sufficient to produce the good from 
yarn: In order to be considered as originating in the country for the 
purpose of GSP, the yarn also has to be made in the country concerned; 
hence yarn production as well as the knitting has to be undertaken 
domestically. Similarly, woven clothes cannot be made from imported 
fabrics; in order to obtain GSP benefits, the country needs its own 
production of fabrics. This is less of a problem for large countries such as 
China or India, but for small developing countries this is indeed a 
limitation. For example, RO is probably the reason why Bangladesh 
claims GSP treatment for only 81% of its exports to Norway (see GSP 
utilisation tables in Appendix D). For LDCs, rules of origin is likely to be 
a greater problem than for other developing countries (UNCTAD 2003). 
If the preference margin due to GSP is just a few percentage points, it 
may be the case that the costs of RO are larger than the GSP benefit. This 
is one of the reasons why utilisation of GSP increases with the margin of 
preference (OECD 2005). In fact, a tariff rebate of less than 3-5% may 
actually be worth nothing at all. 
Also in the case of RO, however, the limitations of GSP may be an 
argument for improving it rather than to abandon it. Less restrictive RO 
should therefore be a purpose.  
 
9. Almost ¾ of Norway’s imports is covered by free trade agreements 
(FTAs). The impact of GSP therefore cannot be understood without 
taking into account the FTAs. 
 
Diagram 2, from Melchior (2005a), shows that GSP is only one out of 
several different trade regimes. 
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Diagram 2: Norway's trade regimes for 233 countries
LDCs (49)
Botswana and 
Namibia (2)
FTAs (44)
Ordinary GSP 
(100)
MFN-WTO (13)
MFN, non-WTO 
(25)
 
 
Ordinary GSP covers 100 countries, and “extended preferences” that are 
even better, are given to the LDCs, Botswana and Namibia. Norway has 
FTAs with 44 countries, and only 13+25 out of the 233 trade partners do 
not have any trade preferences. This multitude of trade regime is even 
more visible in the EU trade regime. Diagram 3, also from Melchior 
(2005a) shows average tariffs for EUs various trade regimes. MFN here 
again indicates the applied tariffs for countries with no trade preferences. 
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Diagram 3: EU's tariff hierarchy, 2003
Calculated from TRAINS tariff data.
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Even if GSP cuts tariffs by half on average, many countries are even better 
off. On top of the hierarchy, we find the extended preferences granted by 
EU to 
- the LDCs, under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative 
- the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries under the Cotonou 
Agreement 
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- Pakistan and eleven countries in Latin America under the “Countries 
fighting drugs” regime.4 
Between these extended preferences and ordinary GSP we also find a 
number of FTAs with better trade conditions than GSP. 
While many countries are covered by GSP and extended preferences, 
some of them are small so the share of trade covered by such preferences 
is more limited. Table 1 shows the share of trade covered by the various 
regime types, for the EU, USA and Norway. 
 
Table 1: Norway, EU and the USA; % shares of imports covered 
by different trade regimes (using 2003 import data) 
 Norway 
EU – 
individual 
country 
EU 
together USA 
Free trade agreements 74.2 72.5 22.8 33.0 
Extended preferences 0.7 1.9 5.4 4.0 
Regular preferences 10.8 12.0 33.6 9.5 
MFN-WTO 12.0 13.6 38.1 51.9 
Other 2.4 0.0 0.1 1.6 
Sum 100 100 100 100 
Source: Melchior (2005a). 
 
In all cases, extended preferences account for a modest share of trade, and 
regular preferences are more important. MFN-WTO trade constitutes more 
than half of U.S. imports, and 38% for the EU if only extra-EU trade is 
considered. If intra-EU trade is included, however, the MFN-WTO share 
drops to 14% for the EU, close to the 12% figure for Norway. 
Table 2 shows the relative tariff reduction under the various regime 
types:  
 
                                                 
4 Following a WTO dispute on this regime, see Melchior (2005c), it was abandoned on 1 
July 2005 as part of the renewal of EUs GSP regime.  
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Table 2: The hierarchy of trade regimes in the EU, 
USA and Norway (average of ad valorem tariffs) 
 EU USA Norway 
MFN-WTO 5.60 4.26 1.58 
GSP 2.84 2.82 0.90 
LDC 0.00 1.98 0.00 
Extended GSP 0.26 1.80 0.12 
FTAs 1.30 0.46 0.95 
Expressed in % of the MFN tariff: 
 EU USA Norway 
MFN-WTO 100 100 100 
GSP 51 66 57 
LDC 0 46 0 
Extended GSP 5 42 8 
FTAs 23 11 60 
Source: Melchior (2005a). 
 
The pattern that emerges from this, is that: 
- In all three countries, ordinary GSP implies on average less than 50% 
tariff cuts. In % of the MFN tariffs, the reduction is grossly similar in 
the three countries   – with somewhat more modest cuts in the USA. 
- In Europe (EU and Norway), extended GSP is generous by providing 
almost complete tariff elimination, but in the USA this is not the case. 
The difference viz. the USA is however exaggerated here, since 
AGOA includes non-automatic additional preferences for textiles that 
have not been taken into account in the figures above. 
- For the USA, FTAs is the most beneficial tariff regime, while in 
Norway, FTAs are not much better than ordinary GSP. This is due to 
recent improvements in the Norwegian GSP system. The EU is in-
between.  
As shown by Melchior (2005b), including specific tariffs in agriculture 
does not change this ranking of regimes for Norway very much. When 
comparing tariff levels across countries, however, the picture is changed 
by agriculture; the low tariffs for Norway in Table 2 mainly reflect 
manufacturing and the relatively more liberalized parts of agriculture. 
 
10. Contrary to what we might expect, the share of FTAs for Norway has 
not increased that much over time. 
 
When Norway established its GSP system in 1971, it was already a 
member of EFTA, and the FTA with the EU (then EEC) followed in 1973. 
The share of trade covered by FTAs then jumped to 70%. As shown in 
Diagram 4, this share has not increased very much later:5 
 
                                                 
5 Data source: Trade data from COMTRADE. Overview of  FTAs: Own dataset. 
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Diagram 4: The share of Norway's foreign trade covered by 
free trade agreement partners 
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With growing intra-EFTA trade in the 1960s, the FTA trade share climbed 
to above 45%. After the FTA with EU was signed, the share of trade 
covered by FTAs remained stable at around 70% until the early 1990s. 
The extension of new FTAs in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to 
an increase in the share; this was however dampened by a falling share for 
Western Europe in world trade (see Melchior 2003). The diagram also 
shows the projected share in 2006 if all current FTA negotiations succeed. 
Adding significant countries such as Canada and Korea, this would bring 
the share above 80% (with oil and gas included).6 
 
11. The trade-promoting impact of GSP is lower if other trade partners 
have even better market access under FTAs, but GSP is still an 
advantantage. 
 
Even of Norway’s GSP system has been comparatively generous, it has 
implied partial rather than complete tariff elimination. Furthermore, 
neighbours in Western Europe obtained even better market access through 
FTAs. As a consequence, imports from developing countries (DCs) were 
less stimulated than it would have been in the absence of FTAs. There is 
in fact no empirical analysis that attempts to measure the impact of GSP 
using data that fully accounts for FTAs. Such an analysis is a demanding 
task requiring extensive data for a long period. This is probably a main 
reason why, to our knowledge, limited evidence exists on the issue, even if 
the point has been acknowledged (see e.g. Hoekman et al. 2004) and some 
                                                 
6 EFTA’s negotiations with Korea were successfully completed on 8 July 2005, but the 
agreement will enter into force later. 
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effects are implicit in numerical simulation models (so-called Computable 
General Equilibrium or CGE models).  
Hence the impact of GSP depends on the relative position compared to 
other suppliers. As a theoretical illustration of the point, we use a simple 
demand model to simulate the demand shift due to tariff preferences. We 
simulate the following scenarios: 
 
Table 3: The demand impact of tariff changes:  
Scenarios used in numerical simulation 
 Original 
MFN 
GSP 
only 
FTA 
only 
FTA+GSP Zero 
MFN 
Domestic 0 0 0 0 0 
Neighbour 20% 20% 0 0 0 
Developing 20% 10% 20% 10% 0 
Other 20% 20% 20% 20% 0 
 
If we introduce GSP in a situation where no other suppliers have 
preferences, we may compare “original MFN” and “GSP only”, and it is 
evident that GSP is a clear improvement. If, however, neighbours have 
free trade as in “FTA only”, the impact of GSP will be different and 
“FTA+GSP” is the relevant scenario. In order to illustrate these effects, we 
use a numerical model and compare the scenarios, also including the 
option of free trade for all suppliers. We use a standard demand model and 
simulate the change in demand for the four suppliers.7 Diagram 5 shows 
the percentage change in the different scenarios – all compared to the 
“original MFN” situation: 
 
                                                 
7 We use a CES demand function with an elasticity of substitution between suppliers at 3. 
The qualitative impact does not depend on t he magnitude of the elasticity, although the 
scale does. 
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Diagram 5: The impact of GSP depends on FTAs
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On the whole, the situation with GSP+FTA resembles the trade policy 
situation for Norwegian manufacturing during the period from 1971 until 
approximately 1995. DCs had complete tariff elimination for many goods, 
but for core products such as textiles and clothing, GSP was limited. As 
shown in Diagram 5, the trade impact of such partial preferences were 
limited because trade liberalisation was deeper within the FTAs. In order 
to understand the trade impact of GSP we cannot compare with the MFN 
situation, but with the “FTA only” situation. Hence without GSP, DCs 
would have lost market shares. Even if the trade impact of GSP is modest 
compared to the MFN situation, it is larger when we consider the effect of 
the FTAs. Hence even if the benefits of GSP are undermined by the FTAs, 
the developing countries would have been worse off without GSP. 
Observe also that among the scenarios illustrated, free trade for all 
suppliers is the best option for developing countries.  
 
12. Trade may be limited by product standards, but this does not 
invalidate GSP 
 
It is also true that product standards and health regulation sin agriculture 
may limit trade. For agricultural goods, OECD (2005) suggests that 
veterinary standards may be important for explaining why GSP did not 
have a stronger impact on trade. Even if this may be true, it is not an 
argument against tariff preferences. Although there is general agreement 
about the problems related to standards and compliance by poor countries, 
the argument may have been oversold, an some countries are actually 
capable of penetrating markets even with strict standards. Jaffee and 
Henson (2005, 111) conclude “the picture for developing countries as a 
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whole is much less pessimistic than that widely presented by the 
standards-as-barriers perspective”.  
The evidence from interviews with importers conducted in this project 
also suggested that standards represent a manageable problem for many 
ordinary developing countries, but a severe problem for the LDCs. To a 
large extent, the latter do not have the infrastructure, institutions or skills 
needed to comply with rich-country standards. For other DCs, standards 
may be a challenge, but one that is possible to manage. 
  
13. Tariff preferences matter, unless other GSP-related barriers nullify 
the benefits. 
 
Since some of the literature on GSP is a tale of pessimism and discontent, 
it is appropriate to remember the simple fact that prices matter, and tariffs 
still matter. If GSP gives a relative price improvement of 10%, it may be 
undermined by other trade-limiting factors, but the developing country is 
still better off. Only if the costs related to RO and other administrative 
costs for GSP are larger than the preference margin, will the GSP be of no 
value  and the traders may choose not to use it. If the preference margin 
exceeds these costs, the impact should be significant even if the evidence 
presented to this effect is still limited. Even if the effects of GSP are 
undermined by standards, FTAs and other factors, tariff preferences may 
still be of value.  
Other research on the impact of tariffs also renders it likely that GSP 
has had a significant effect. Due to better availability of trade and tariff 
data, recent research has shed new light on the magnitude of import 
demand elasticities. For such elasticities there is considerable variation 
across sectors and countries; Kee et al. (2004) e.g. find an average across 
sectors for Norway at –1.93. The implication is that a 10% tariff 
preference in Norway will on average boost demand by around 20%. But 
if all your neighbours have a preference of 20%, however, the impact may 
be modest, as illustrated above.  
OECD (2005) e.g. shows that in cases when the preference margin is 
substantial, utilisation rates are also high.8  Hence if GSP improves the 
relative price of a supplier significantly, this matters unless the advantage 
is nullified by rules of origin or other non-tariff barriers related to GSP 
itself. If GSP is limited and other suppliers have much better access, such 
as for e.g. textiles in the USA and the EU, it is no surprise if the impact is 
hard to measure. On the other hand, it is likely that the performance of 
GSP beneficiaries would have been even worse without GSP.  
 
                                                 
8 OECD (2005) also shows that many beneficiaries are eligible for different schemes and 
this explains why they do not use all of them. For example, Bangladesh alone represents 
63% of imports under EBA (Everything but arms) because other LDCs use the ACP 
regime instead. Some earlier studies did not take into account this, and reached too 
pessimistic conclusions. 
16         Arne Melchior 
14. For the LDCs, pessimism may be better founded. 
 
Above, we have argued against the widespread pessimism related to GSP: 
Tariff preferences may be of value even if trade is impeded by other 
factors. It is possible that even better trading arrangements could be made, 
but this does not “invalidate” GSP. With respect to the extended 
preferences for LDCs, however, the pessimism seems to be better 
founded. About preferences for LDCs, UNCTAD (2003) concludes 
“Beyond some relative success stories, the picture is dismal”. This 
impression is supported by OECD (2005). Several studies conclude that 
restrictive RO are a major problem for LDCs (see references above). 
The interviews conducted with Norwegian importers for this study 
generally suggested that LDCs and DCs were perceived as two different 
worlds; with the former frequently lacking the skills, infrastructure, 
institutions and investment needed to succeed. As we shall show below, 
the experience with Norway’s imports from LDCs also points to a few 
success stories, but otherwise modest progress. 
Due to this “dismal” picture, it is widely accepted that the poorest 
countries need much more than market access in order to succeed. Trade-
related aid is therefore important for these countries. This has also been 
acknowledged by the Norwegian Government, e.g. in a report to the 
Parliament (St.meld. nr. 35, 2003-2004), and trade-related aid to e.g. the 
agricultural sector is currently stepped up.  
Private companies have also engaged in long-term projects to improve 
the supply capacity of LDCs: The major grain company Norske Felleskjøp 
has initiated a project to increase imports of animal feed (soya) from 
Mozambique. The first shipment recently arrived, and after critical 
inspection by the Norwegian Food Safety Authority it was finally allowed 
to enter. The project has been supported by aid.  
In this report and in the project in general, we do not examine trade-
related aid, but it should be observed that this is an important aspect, 
particularly but not exclusively related to the poorest countries. 
 
15. Concerns for preference erosion should not undermine multilateral 
negotiations, and GSP should be designed to minimize these problems. 
 
A serious concern about GSP is that beneficiaries may become more eager 
to protect their own trade privileges than to promote trade that may benefit 
other developing countries. This concern has been expressed for a long 
time (see e.g. Michalopoulos 1985), and according to Özden and 
Reinhardt (2004a) the impact was present already in the Tokyo Round 
negotiations of GATT in the 1970s. It has certainly been present later, and 
in the current WTO round, preference erosion is a major issue. Özden and 
Reinhardt (2003) provide empirical evidence to the effect that GSP 
actually makes developing countries less liberal in trade policy. With 
respect to preference erosion, the fear has been that multilateral trade 
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liberalisation will undermine trade preferences and create losses for the 
beneficiaries. 
The “preference erosion” debate has been particularly lively related to 
EU preferences for the ACP countries. The conflicts about “dollar 
bananas” from South America and “ACP bananas” have raged for years; 
apparently the signing of the Rome Treaty in 1957 was delayed due to 
bananas. Recently, a fear of preference erosion due to reforms in EU 
agricultural policy has been expressed. Some African countries have 
extended preferences for sugar, and will be hit by reforms that allow the 
large sugar producers such as Brazil to enter. Melchior (2005c) reviews 
some attempts to quantify the impact. Mauritius, Guyana and Swaziland. 
face relatively large losses due to sugar reform. On the other hand, the 
impact on the world economy is small and some other developing 
countries stand to gain when the currently distorted world market for sugar 
is reformed. The biggest winner is Brazil, but also countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa may gain. Francois et al. (2005) show that losses due to 
preference erosion is primarily related to the EU preferences. Some results 
may however exaggerate the losses since they do not take into account that 
preferences are not fully utilized, and furthermore that some of the gains 
from preferences are captured by importers rather than exporters (ibid., see 
also Olarreaga and Özden 2005, Silva 2005).  
For these reasons, concerns for preference erosion should not be 
allowed to block or hinder multilateral liberalisation that may benefit 
development in general, and other developing countries. The results of 
Anderson et al. (2005) suggest that Sub-Saharan Africa may gain more 
from WTO agricultural reform than other developing countries, in spite of 
terms of trade losses. The results also indicate that increased trade between 
developing countries is important for the development impact of the 
current round, and that developing countries therefore should undertake 
liberalisation themselves. A proposal is that trade-related aid could be 
given in exchange for such commitments by the developing countries.  
In spite of such calculations, the potential losers may not be 
convinced. The political economy arguments against GSP are real, and so 
serious that future GSP systems should be designed to reduce such 
problems. Mega-preferences to a handful of countries should be avoided, 
so that traders face real competition that prepares then for competition 
from other developing countries. Helping the poorest should not be done 
at the expense of the second poorest (see Melchior 2005c). 
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Norway’s imports from developing 
countries 
 
16. Norway’s import share from developing countries has increased 
considerably over the last 10 years, mainly due to China. 
 
Norway has a comparatively generous GSP system for manufacturing, but 
has this led to increased imports? As also shown by Maurseth (2005a), 
Norway has a lower share of imports from developing countries than 
OECD in general. During the last decade, this share has however 
increased considerably. Diagram 6 shows the share of developing 
countries in Norway’s imports of goods 1978-2004.  
When presenting such a long time series for imports, a special problem 
is how to define developing countries. Singapore was clearly a developing 
country some years ago, but today it is a high-income country and it is 
questionable to call it DC. In the graphs, we have used the current OECD 
list of Official Development Assistance (ODA) recipients as the 
developing country definition. This excludes countries such as Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Israel and Korea, which were clearly developing countries 
some years ago.9 It should therefore be observed that the graphs show the 
share of current developing countries.  
 
Diagram 6: The share of current developing countries in 
Norway's imports, 1976-2004 (based om COMTRADE data)
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9 See Melchior (2005c) for a discussion about DC definitions. 
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For some years, especially around 1990, trade data are strongly influenced 
by trade in second-hand ships for registration and tax purposes. The peak 
around 1990 is due to this. For example, Norway imported ships for more 
than 900 million USD per year from the LDC Liberia in some years 
around 1990, due to changes in Norway’s laws for registration of ships. In 
Diagram 6a we also show the trade shares with ships and boats excluded. 
Note that trade in new ships and boats is then also excluded. This gives a 
more appropriate picture of the development of “normal” trade. 
 
Diagram 6a: The share of current developing countries in 
Norway's imports excluding ships and boats (SITC 793), 1976-
2004 (based on COMTRADE data)
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Diagram 6a shows more smoothly that: 
- Before 1990, the share of current developing countries in Norway’s 
imports decreased steadily and quite dramatically. The main reason 
was Norway’s increasing oil production: In 1976, more than half of 
Norway’s imports from developing countries was oil, and almost half 
of Norway’s oil imports originated in developing countries. A less 
important, and partly corresponding, reason is that in the late 1970s 
and late 1980s, the EU share of imports increased. Increasing imports 
from newly industrialising countries in Asia, such as Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Korea are also an explanation.  
- The trend was reversed around 1990. After that, current developing 
countries except China have increased their share, to 6.4% in 2004. 
Import growth from China has accelerated much faster, to a share of 
5% in 2004. Hence the combined share for developing countries in 
Norway’s imports is currently 11.4%. See also Maurseth (2005b) for a 
closer analysis. 
The 1990s is therefore a period of globalisation, with more trade with non-
European countries. 
 
17. Norway’s share of imports from developing countries is low in 
international comparison, but if we correct for geographical location, 
Norway’s trade with developing countries is “normal”. 
 
A share of imports from developing countries at 11.4% in 2004 is less than 
half of the corresponding share for OECD-24, i.e. the original “rich man’s 
club”. In 2004, this share was at 24.2%, using the same (relatively narrow) 
developing country definition.  
Cline (2002) and Birdsall and Roodman (2003) used imports from 
developing countries (as a share of GDP) as an indication that Norway had 
a more restrictive trade policy. While agricultural protection was the main 
reason why Norway dropped down the “development friendliness” 
ranking, low trade with developing countries was a secondary reason 
(ibid.). Drawing such conclusions about trade policy from trade shares is 
however not warranted, since different aspects affect these shares. The 
magnitude of imports from developing countries depends not only on trade 
policy, but also industrial structure, geographical location and history. For 
example, some EU countries have large imports due to colonial ties in the 
past, and Denmark imports sugar for processing since this can be exported 
with EU subsidies. In the case of Norway, the elimination of oil imports is 
a conspicuous example showing that trade depends on industrial structure. 
Geography also matters strongly because if a country is surrounded by 
developing countries, it will have a higher share of trade with such 
countries. Using a “gravity model” to correct for this, Maurseth (2005a) 
finds that Norway is a normal trader in this respect. The propensity to 
trade with developing countries also varies strongly among EU countries, 
but France and Germany stand out with relatively large trade with 
developing countries. 
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18. Norway’s imports from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are 
small, with textiles and clothing from Bangladesh as the largest 
component. 
 
In the analysis of imports from LDCs, we exclude imports of second-hand 
ships from Liberia, which dwarf all other trade with the LDCs, especially 
around 1990. For the rest, the trend has been as shown in Diagram 7. 
 
Diagram 7: LDC share of Norway's total imports
(SITC Chapter 7 from Liberia excluded)
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Hence the import share for LDCs also declined until the late 1980s, 
whereafter it increased. There main reason for the increase was growth in 
the imports of textiles and clothing from Bangladesh, but other imports 
from LDCs have fluctuated around a 0.1% share. Imports of cut flowers 
from African LDCs have increased, and there have been some imports of 
oilseeds, and sugar for animal feeding. The share of LDCs in Norway’s 
imports is currently 0.2%, while the LDCs have a share of world exports 
around 0.6%. For more evidence, see Maurseth (2005a) and Melchior 
(2005c). 
It is likely that clothing imports from Bangladesh has been stimulated 
by GSP, since Bangladesh has benefited from zero tariffs, as a least-
developed country. The absence of quotas has also been important. As we 
will show in the following, the relative market access for other developing 
countries has also improved quite sharply for manufacturing over the last 
decade. Although we do not present a causal or econometric analysis of 
the issue, it is likely that this improvement has stimulated trade. The 
growth in China is however another important reason, which has only a 
little to do with Norwegian GSP. 
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19. For textiles and clothing, the tariff preference for Bangladesh in 
Norway has been eroded, but this has apparently not been a problem.   
 
Preference erosion has also been a theme related to the elimination of 
textile quotas, where some countries fear losing market shares to China 
and other strong suppliers after 1.1.2005 (see e.g. Mlachila and Yang 
2004). The case of Norway’s imports from Bangladesh is an interesting 
case, since imports have increased rapidly in spite of the preference 
erosion. From the mid-1980s, other suppliers were restrained by MFA 
textile quota agreements while Bangladesh could expand freely. In 
addition, Bangladesh had zero tariffs as an LDC. The phasing-out of 
Norwegian textile quotas during the 1990s, and the reduction of 
Bangladesh’s tariff preference due to tariff reductions for other suppliers 
(see more evidence below), has certainly led to a strong erosion of the 
Bangladesh preference. As shown in Diagram 8, however, imports of 
clothing from Bangladesh have not slowed: 
 
Diagram 8: Norway's imports of textiles and clothing from 
Bangladesh, 1976-2004 (Data source: COMTRADE)
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Clothing imports have continued to accelerate, so here there is no sign of 
adverse effects.10 Hence at least in the case of Norway, the fear of losses 
                                                 
10 Bangladesh export data for SITC 84 Clothing are available from the COMTRADE 
database for 2001 and 2003. These suggest that there has not been a sharp import 
increase. We do not have an explanation of this. Given that Bangladesh ranks high on 
international lists of corruption, the possibility of re-routing of goods from other 
countries could be checked, or false declarations on the origin of goods. We do not, 
however, have any evidence suggesting that this is the case. 
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from preference erosion due to the elimination of textile quotas has not 
materialised. 
 
20. Clothing imports from developing countries have increased 
considerably for all the Scandinavian countries… 
 
A core sector related to GSP is clothing. Diagram 9 shows imports per 
capita of clothing from developing countries and from China, for Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden. Clothing has traditionally been a “sensitive” sector 
with respect to imports from the South, so imports should be strongly 
affected by trade policy. 
 
Diagram 9: Imports of clothing (SITC 84) from developing 
countries (DC) and from China, as % of GDP, 
for Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 1978-2002
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The shares have increased continuously over time, but with Denmark 
continuously on top. Tariff reductions and the easing of quotas may have 
played a role, but growing supply capacity in e.g. China also mattered. 
Sweden suffered from a transitional drop after EU membership in 1995, 
illustrating that Sweden had a more liberal import regime before 
membership. The share of developing country imports into Sweden is now 
again increasing after the transitional shock. In the mean time, Norway has 
taken over the second place among the three Scandinavians in terms of 
developing country imports. Considering that Norway has a very high 
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GDP per capita due to the oil wealth from the 1970s, the diagram may 
understate the growth in Norway’s imports from developing countries. 
 
21. … but imports of agriculture have a falling share.  
 
For agriculture, the pattern is different not only because of Norway’s level 
of protection, but also because agriculture has generally not been 
liberalised in FTAs. Some partial liberalisation has been undertaken in the 
agreement with the EU, but in general, there has traditionally not been a 
large preference margin in favour of the free trade partners. Norway’s 
imports of some tropical products was liberalised at an early stage, and 
traditional imports of agriculture from developing countries has existed for 
a long time. Over time, however, imports of agriculture from developing 
countries have declined as a share of GDP. This decline is shown in 
Diagram 10.  
 
Diagram 10: Imports of agricultural goods from developing 
countries as % of GDP, for Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
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Agriculture is a declining sector in terms of its share of world GDP, and 
this is also reflected in imports: The share has declined steadily over time 
for all three Scandinavian countries. Also in this case, Denmark has the 
highest share, but Norway has passed Sweden in the last part of the period, 
in spite of the more restrictive trade policy in Norway. This illustrates that 
import trends over time are affected by a number of factors, and it is 
therefore not easy to distinguish the impact of trade policy and GSP from 
other aspects. Growing imports of manufactured goods, and (relatively) 
declining imports of agricultural goods, are affected by trade policy, but 
also more fundamental changes.  
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GSP for manufacturing 
 
22. During the last 10 years, the relative advantage of FTA partners 
relative to GSP has been almost fully eliminated for manufacturing. 
 
During the last ten years, the trade policy situation for Norwegian 
manufacturing has moved towards “zero MFN” as illustrated in Diagram 
5. This has occurred due to the following causes: 
− MFN tariffs have been reduced due to the Uruguay Round of the 
WTO. 
− The Norwegian Government has autonomously undertaken significant 
reductions in MFN applied tariffs. 
− GSP benefits have been extended to more products. 
Since 1995, more than 3000 manufacturing tariffs have been eliminated. 
In 2005, MFN tariffs remained for only 322 of totally more than 6000 
tariff lines in manufacturing, in the textile and clothing area. For these 322 
lines, GSP implied complete tariff elimination for ¾. Hence for 
developing countries, tariffs remained for only 80 tariff lines in 
manufacturing. While the average for these 80 lines is 10%, the simple 
average for clothing is 2%. Weighted by imports from developing 
countries, however, the average is higher, at 4.3%. Diagram 11 shows this 
radical change over the last ten years, for clothing (HS chapters 61 and 
62).11 Weighted averages are only presented for 1996-2005. 
 
                                                 
11 Tariff data from the UNCTAD database TRAINS have been used for 1988. Results for 
the period 1995-2005 are based on a background note that analyses textile tariffs in 
greater detail. Interested readers may obtain this upon request. 
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Diagram 11: Norwegian tariffs for clothing 1988-2005
(HS Chapters 61, 62, simple and weighted averages) 
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Under the European FTAs, clothing tariffs were zero already in the 1970s, 
and this also applied to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) under GSP. 
Until the late 1990s, these two groups had a substantial tariff preference 
compared to ordinary DCs as well as third countries such as the USA, that 
were subject to MFN tariffs. In 2005, however, the MFN tariff average 
had been cut to 10% and the GSP average to 2% (simple average) or 4.3% 
(trade-weighted average). Hence the relative price has changed 
considerably to the advantage of ordinary developing countries. 
 
23. The most significant “preference erosion” has therefore been to the 
advantage of developing countries. 
 
As noted earlier, there have recently been complaints that the trade 
preferences of developing countries have been or may be eroded by 
multilateral trade liberalisation. In this debate, it is frequently forgotten 
that multilateral liberalisation also erodes the trade preferences due to 
FTAs between rich countries. In the case of Norway and clothing, there 
was an intra-European tariff preference of almost 20% in the late 1980s, 
and this has now been cut to 2-4%. It is true that LDCs preferences have 
also been eroded, but LDCs represent a tiny fraction of trade while intra-
European trade has a large share. Furthermore, we have seen that clothing 
imports from Bangladesh have not suffered from preference erosion. The 
economic significance of eroding the intra-European preferences is 
therefore much larger. Since trade under ordinary GSP is more than 15 
times larger than under the LDC scheme, this improvement of market 
access for a number of DCs is an important improvement in the 
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Norwegian trade regime. In the perspective of global development, 
preference erosion should be promoted rather than feared.  
 
24. The elimination of textile quotas has increased the impact of GSP. 
 
In the case of binding quantitative restrictions (quotas), it may be the case 
that tariffs have no impact on the traded quantity – in that case the tariffs 
only affect the distribution of rents between traders and the treasury of the 
importing country. In such a situation, the impact of tariff cuts through 
GSP may be to transfer income from the treasury to the trading firms. If 
GSP is to promote imports from developing countries, it should not be 
combined with tight quantitative restrictions. 
During the 1980s, Norway had one of the most restrictive quota 
regimes for clothing in the world (see Melchior 1993). From the mid-
1980s, the quota regime was gradually liberalised, until the last quota 
disappeared in 2002. Hence quotas have not undermined the 
improvements in GSP over the last 10 years.  
Contrary to the EU and the USA, Norway does not apply product-
specific “graduation” (taking away GSP benefits when DC market shares 
pass certain thresholds), and it does not practice contingent protection 
such as anti-dumping. Hence for manufacturing, the Norwegian import 
regime is truly and increasingly liberal. As illustrated in Diagram 5, the 
introduction of zero MFN tariffs is likely to be an improvement for DCs. 
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25. … but restrictive rules of origin may be a serious problem for small 
developing country suppliers. 
 
The problem of RO has already been observed. RO are made less strict by 
cumulation, whereby inputs imported from certain countries are accepted. 
In Norway’s GSP system there are three types of cumulation:  
− Bilateral cumulation implies that inputs from Norway are treated 
among the “domestic” components when RO are applied. 
− Diagonal cumulation implies that inputs from the EU, EFTA and 
Switzerland are also accepted. 
− Regional cumulation implies that inputs from regional blocs are 
accepted; this applies so far only to ASEAN. 
Such rules of cumulation may have a significant trade-creating impact and 
reduce the RO burden (Augier et al. 2005). For small developing suppliers 
beyond FTAs, however, this is no solution. 
In order to practice diagonal cumulation as well as rules for transit, the 
Norwegian RO have to be harmonised with those of the EU and 
Switzerland. This is not a strict legal requirement, so differences may 
exist. Harmonisation is nevertheless a clear ambition. European 
harmonisation is also good in order to reduce the complexity of the trade 
systems; too complex RO may act as a non-tariff barrier to trade. 
In its current reform of the GSP system, the EU plans a reform also of 
its RO. Instead of using process rules such as the ones described for 
textiles and clothing, the EU will increasingly apply value criteria; i.e. 
rules specifying the share of domestic value added. It is too early to 
conclude whether this will imply any significant liberalisation of the RO. 
Laos, a Least Developed Country, has recently obtained an exception 
to the RO so that e.g. single processing of textiles and clothing is 
sufficient to obtain GSP benefits. This applies in coordination between 
Norway and the EU. There is currently no signal that such exceptional 
treatment will be extended to other countries.  
 
26. Zero MFN tariffs eliminate the need for controlling the origin of 
products, and therefore have an important simplifying impact. 
 
The Norwegian Government has signalled the intention to eliminate all 
tariffs for manufacturing. An important additional effect of this is to 
eliminate the need to control the origin of goods. For the clothing items 
where MFN tariffs are 10% but GSP tariffs are zero; there is currently an 
“additional tax” related to RO. Hence the GSP tariff preference is not 
actually 10%, but less. The problem is larger for small developing 
countries without their own yarn and fabric industry. The same applies for 
LDCs for the products where they have a preference compared to ordinary 
DCs. The “preference erosion” if MFN tariffs are reduced to zero is 
therefore less than the “nominal” preference margin. While 3-5% is a 
standard estimate on the administrative costs of RO, small countries may 
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on top of this simply be unable to use GSP because they cannot comply 
with RO. Demanding that small poor countries should establish their own 
industry for yarn and fabrics in order to export clothing to Norway is 
unreasonable. 
 
27. For these reasons, reducing the remaining manufacturing tariffs to 
zero is an efficient way of further improving market access for 
developing countries as well as LDCs, and simplifying the trade system. 
 
Given that ¾ of imports face no tariffs, concerns for Norwegian 
production is not a major concern in this context. The remaining 
Norwegian textile and clothing industry hardly relies on tariffs in order to 
survive. 
In recent years, trade liberalisation for textiles and clothing has 
significantly contributed to lower price growth in Norway, and thereby 
increased consumer welfare. This final step in liberalising textile and 
clothing imports may add further to this gain, although it is likely that the 
major benefits have already been reaped. 
 
28. On GSP for manufacturing, our main policy recommendation is 
therefore to improve market access by eliminating all tariffs and making 
GSP as well as the corresponding RO redundant.  
 
30         Arne Melchior 
Trade policy for agriculture and food 
 
29. For agriculture, Norway is far from full liberalisation… 
 
For manufacturing, Norway has a low MFN tariff level; significantly 
lower than e.g. the USA and the EU, and a comparatively generous GSP 
system. For agriculture, however, this is not the case. Although Norway 
has a liberal trade regime for certain tropical products, the overall level of 
protection is high. In Melchior (2005b), ad valorem equivalents of the 
specific tariffs are calculated. Diagram 12 shows the distribution for MFN 
applied tariffs. As we shall see later, the applied tariffs are in many cases 
lower than the bound tariffs, that are subject to WTO negotiations. Later, 
we shall also illustrate GSP and other preferential tariffs. Detailed tables 
with the individual tariffs are available for interested readers upon request. 
 
Diagram 12: MFN applied tariffs for Norwegian agriculture, 
with ad valorem equivalents for specific tariffs
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Hence 36% if the tariff lines in agriculture are zero, but the distribution is 
a “viking ship” where some tariffs are extremely high. For example, 10% 
of the tariff lines are above 300%. The highest is above 4000%, according 
to the calculations, for a type of animal feedstuff.  
The ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs depend on the prices 
used in the calculations. For agricultural products in general, Norwegian 
import prices are generally higher than world market prices. This may 
partly be because of demand for quality products, but this is likely also an 
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impact of the tariff regime itself. High specific tariffs increase the 
protective impact versus low-cost suppliers and switches imports towards 
high-price items. For example, under the minimum access quotas for meat, 
imports are mainly of high-price items such as tenderloin. For these 
reasons, ad valorem tariff equivalents are generally higher when 
Norwegian import prices are used, compared to the case with world 
market prices. We obtain an average for MFN applied tariffs in agriculture 
at 73-103%, depending on the calculation method. If individual tariffs are 
weighted by DC exports, the tariff average drops to 54-74% - showing that 
tariffs are particularly high for products from temperate agriculture. On 
the other hand, if DCs have prices below the average, the protective 
impact of specific tariffs may be even higher than our calculations suggest. 
 
30. …. hence we explore options for partial liberalisation. 
 
The Government has stated that it will consider reforms that maintain 
protection for core parts of Norwegian agriculture (see Appendix A). For 
manufacturing, zero MFN tariffs will eliminate all issues related to the 
design of GSP and its administration. For agriculture, however, only a 
partial increase in market access is on the agenda. Hence we have to 
address issues related to 
− product coverage 
− differentiation between groups of developing countries  
− administrative features, including the use of tariff rate quotas. 
 
31. GSP for agriculture is currently unlimited for LDCs, but limited for 
developing countries in general. 
 
The LDCs obtained zero tariffs for agriculture already in 1976 (see 
Appendix C), but the impact of this was limited since before the Uruguay 
Round (UR), protection in agriculture was based on quantitative 
restrictions rather than tariffs. Due to “tariffication” in the UR, GSP 
became more important. Tariffs for LDCs were re-introduced in 1995 for 
some goods (grains and feedstuff), but these were again abandoned from 1 
July 2002. There is however a surveillance system for these goods; so 
protection may be reinstated if imports from LDCs threatens the “market 
balance”. There is not automatic licensing, but importers have to apply in 
advance, within certain deadlines. So far, however, the safeguard clause 
has not been invoked. 
For the 64% of the tariff lines in agriculture that are not zero for all 
suppliers, Diagram 13 shows how much tariffs are reduced in % due to 
ordinary GSP. 
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Diagram 13: Norwegian agriculture - GSP rate in % of MFN 
applied rate
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For 18% the tariffs are fully eliminated, but the most common reduction is 
10-15%. As a result, the tariff average under GSP is cut by a modest 10-15 
percentage points. The GSP tariff average in agriculture is thereby in the 
range 62-90%, or 46-63% if weighted by developing country total exports 
(to all countries) of the goods.  
 
32. For agriculture, free-trade preferences are limited. 
 
As noted above, GSP for manufacturing was introduced in a situation 
where (from 1973) more than 2/3 of imports faced zero tariffs due to 
FTAs. For agriculture, however, FTAs are not very generous and the 
average tariff for the EU is in fact above the GSP level. Diagram 14 shows 
EU tariffs, in % of the MFN tariff. 
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Diagram 14: Norwegian agriculture - EU rate in % of MFN 
applied rate
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For many goods, there is no tariff reduction at all. This is modified by 
TRQs (tariff rate quotas) that increase EU’s market access, but it remains 
nevertheless true that Norwegian agriculture is protected also within the 
FTAs. For agriculture, therefore, GSP may better than FTA rather than 
worse. This is however also an issue of political economy; if Norway 
provided much better market access for DCs in agriculture, it is likely that 
e.g. the EU would push for better access also under the FTAs.  
 
33. Protection is particularly high for meat, dairy products, grains and 
feedstuff 
 
Diagram 15 shows average GSP tariffs for various HS Chapters in 
agriculture. 
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Diagram 15: Norwegian agriculture: GSP tariffs in different 
sectors (using world prices for AVE calculations)
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Protection is highest for meat and meat products, but also high for dairy 
products, grains and feedstuff. For some goods that are important for 
developing countries, such as coffee, fruit etc., tariffs are zero or 
moderate. For fruit and vegetables, protection is often seasonal so market 
access is better in parts of the year.  
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34. Agricultural exports are important for developing countries 
 
In the current WTO Round of trade negotiations, it has become clear that a 
reduction of industrial country protection in agriculture is a major demand 
from the developing world. Although the interests of developing countries 
vary and some are net importers, there is on the whole no doubt that better 
market access in agriculture will stimulate development. Calculations by 
e.g. Anderson et al. (2005) suggest that complete elimination of trade 
barriers in agriculture would render an income gain of 300 billion USD. 
Although 2/3 of this gain would accrue to rich countries, the gain relative 
to GSP would be larger for developing countries. As noted already, Sub-
Saharan Africa would be better off in spite of a terms of trade loss. 
Aksoy and Beghin (2005, 3) conclude that “a strategy based on 
agricultural commodity exports is likely to be impoverishing in the current 
agricultural policy environment.” In a changed policy environment, 
however, developing countries stand to gain: “Agricultural liberalization 
would create winners and losers. The studies conclude that reform would 
reduce rural poverty in developing economies, both because in the 
aggregate they have a strong comparative advantage in agriculture and 
because the agricultural sector is important for income generation in these 
countries.” (ibid.)  
The world markets for some important goods such as sugar and cotton 
are deeply distorted by subsidies in rich countries. Although Norway is not 
the culprit in these cases, and has an open market for some agricultural 
goods from developing countries, there are some areas of major interest to 
developing countries where Norway’s protection is high. 
Compared to manufacturing, agriculture is less concentrated among 
developing countries. For example, Tables D1-D3 in the Appendix show 
that of the imports that received GSP treatment in Norway in 2002, 70% 
came from China. For agriculture, South Africa had the largest share with 
18%.  
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35. For developing country interests, Norwegian protection for feedstuff 
and meat is particularly serious 
 
It is difficult to estimate the 
potential increase in imports 
from developing countries in 
a situation where many 
tariffs are prohibitive. If a 
tariff at 500% is reduced to 
300%, the trade impact is 
likely to be moderate. In 
order to obtain a crude 
indication of the trade 
potential in spite of this, we 
undertake the following 
experiment: We assume (i) 
that only tariff reductions 
below 100% have any effect, 
(ii) that all tariffs are reduced 
to zero, and (iii) weight the 
ensuing tariff reductions by 
developing country exports. 
We then assume that trade 
growth is proportional to 
these tariff reductions, and 
calculate the share in trade 
growth for each sector. Table 
4 shows the results. Tables 
D4 and D5 in the Appendix 
show current imports from 
developing and Least 
Developed Countries, 
respectively. 
The ranking following 
from this table is the 
following: 
1. Product classes related to feedstuffs are most important. In Melchior 
(2005b) it is shown that for sectors 15, 12, 10 and 23 on top of the list 
above, tariff protection is mainly for feedstuff. These fours sectors add 
up to 48% in the table above.  
2. The second most important product group is meat, with a share of 14% 
of the trade potential. 
In addition to these main groups, there are scattered possibilities for e.g. 
frozen vegetables, plants and flowers and some processed food.  
An accurate estimate of the trade potential is very difficult to make. 
We emphasize that the calculation above is not intended as an estimate on 
trade growth, but a crude illustration of the relative importance of different 
Table 4: An illustration of the relative 
importance for developing countries of 
Norway’s trade protection in different 
sectors 
HS 
Chapter Short description 
Relative 
importance 
15 Fats 15.8 
2 Meat 14.3 
12 Oilseed 12.8 
10 Cereals 12.5 
23 Residual animal feed 6.6 
7 Vegetables 6.3 
20 Veg. and fruit products 5.4 
16 Meat products 4.4 
17 Sugar 4.2 
4 Milk/ dairy products 4.1 
6 Plants 3.4 
8 Fruit 2.8 
1 Animals 2.7 
11 Mill products 1.4 
22 Beverages 1.1 
19 Cereal products 0.8 
35 Proteins 0.6 
21 Sauces etc 0.4 
18 Cocoa 0.2 
5 Animal products 0.1 
9 Coffee etc 0.0 
13 Rubber etc 0.0 
14 Straw etc. 0.0 
24 Tobacco 0.0 
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sectors in this context. It is a crude illustration because (i) the prohibitive 
tariffs differ across sectors; (ii) Norwegian demand may be different from 
world demand; (iii) supply and demand elasticities differ across products, 
and the import demand elasticity is likely to be larger than one; and (iv) in 
a more liberal trade environment, the supply capacity of developing 
countries may change.  
  
36. Increased GSP in agriculture will affect Norwegian production. 
 
For meat, there is for several species large supply from developing 
countries. For bovine meat, current imports have already illustrated the 
potential of South American suppliers, e.g. Brazil, Argentina and 
Uruguay. Also for feedstuff, there are several available products, supplied 
by many different countries. As noted by Econ Energi (1995), many of the 
feed inputs are easily substitutable. Products have to be in conformity with 
animal health regulations, but this is not an insolvable problem except for 
the very poorest countries.  
Hence for meat as well as feedstuff, increasing market access under 
GSP is a trade-off between concerns for developing countries and their 
export interests, and concerns for Norwegian agriculture. With the current 
gap between domestic and world prices, there is no doubt that free imports 
of meat from developing countries would threaten to eliminate a 
considerable part of Norway’s meat production. Similarly, full 
liberalization of imports of feedstuff is likely to cause a sharp reduction in 
Norwegian grain production. Feedstuff and grain production are closely 
related so that it may be difficult to have very different import regimes for 
the two. 
Freer imports from developing countries will not necessarily be a 
threat to all parts of agriculture. For example, dairy production is 
important for regional agriculture, but better market access under GSP is 
not likely to cause a flood of imports.  
 
37. Lower grain prices will reduce costs in the rest of agriculture, but 
put cereal production under pressure. 
 
On the other hand, lower prices for animal feed could reduce costs and this 
would be an advantage for dairy as well as other animal farming. Forage 
(“kraftfor”) constitutes around 15% of total costs in agriculture according 
to some estimates, and liberalization of imports could cut prices by more 
than half (see Melchior 2005b for more evidence). This would lead to a 
substantial reduction in costs.  
Grain production is part of the so-called “channeling policy” initiated 
around 1950. This had the purpose of increasing grain production in the 
most fertile agricultural areas in South East Norway, and thereby “leave 
room” for livestock and other agriculture in the peripheries. The policy has 
been partly successful but also very costly; not only due to grain 
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production costs but also because input costs in other agriculture and the 
processing industry are driven up.  
While a considerable share of the domestically produced grain has 
been for animal feed, the domestic supply of food grain has increased over 
time, however with strong variations between years. Food grain 
production has been stimulated by a price differential between food and 
feed grain that is above the one prevailing abroad. The Government has 
therefore signaled that this price differential is to be reduced.  
Even if feed grain and oilseeds are more important for developing 
countries than food grain, it may be difficult to have completely separate 
and different regimes for food and feed grain. This would require strict 
quantitative regulation with large annual changes in import quotas, and 
this would not be very development-friendly. Hence we assume that grain 
production in general will be affected by liberalisation. More than 80% of 
this production is currently in South East Norway. The impact for the 
peripheral regions will mainly be indirect; if livestock production in South 
East Norway increases over time, it has to be accompanied by a reduction 
elsewhere. Such a structural transformation could however reduce costs in 
Norwegian agriculture significantly. This would occur in three ways; (i) 
by cutting direct subsidies to cereal production, (ii) by reducing input costs 
in other agriculture, and (iii) by exploiting scale economies in bovine 
farming. The average number of cows in Norwegian dairy farms has now 
increased from 13 to 16, but a further increase is warranted in order to 
raise efficiency.  
If feedstuff imports are liberalized, it would also be necessary to adjust 
other aspect of agricultural policy. For example, if grain production in 
South East Norway is reduced, an issue is whether the milk quota system 
should also be adjusted. It is beyond the scope of this study to address 
these issues, and we recommend that a more specific examination is 
undertaken later, using a numerical model that appropriately captures the 
regional and economic implications. For cereals, it is also necessary to 
reassess arguments related to “preparedness for conflict”: Embargos 
during the First World War and the Napoleon wars had severe 
consequences for Norway, and such risks are still used as an argument for 
cereal production today. Today, traditional wars with sea embargos in the 
North Sea are less likely, and this argument for protection should be 
weaker. A serious assessment is however beyond the scope of this report.  
Hence import liberalisation vis-à-vis developing countries may have 
important consequences for Norway’s agriculture, and it is a political 
decision whether and to what extent such a structural transformation of 
agriculture is to be undertaken.  
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Differentiation between countries in 
the GSP scheme 
 
38. Allowing free imports from the Least Developed Countries is no 
threat… 
 
Import liberalization for LDCs has had modest effects in Norway as well 
as internationally. For Norway, imports of clothing from Bangladesh and 
cut flowers from Africa have increased due to zero tariffs without quotas 
for the LDCs. While these successes are important, it is nevertheless 
telling that almost no agricultural products have entered from LDCs, even 
when other suppliers are blocked with mega-tariffs of several hundred 
percentage points. Except for grain and oilseeds, there is no safeguard 
mechanism or uncertainty about market access. Importers have had the 
time since July 2002, or even back to 1976, to find LDC products that 
could be imported with sizeable preferences. The fact that so little has 
happened, is the best proof that if we want trade, we have to look beyond 
the LDCs.   
 
39. LDCs should be helped, but more than 4/5 of the world’s poor are in 
other countries that also need our support.  
 
LDCs constitute a small share of the developing world, and also the part 
where measures related to international trade will be least efficient. Table 
5 shows the economic magnitude of some categories of developing 
countries. 12 
 
Table 5: The relative size of various categories of developing countries: 
Share of world total (%) for different variables.  
Category (based on 2002 
income data) Imports Exports 
Agric. 
exports 
Income 
(GNI) 
Income 
(PPP) 
Popu- 
lation 
Poor 
1$ 
Poor 
2$ 
LDC (50) 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 1.8 11 17 13 
Low income (61) 2.5 2.4 2.9 2.7 9 37 69 59 
1000$ (67) 8 9 8 7 23 60 92 88 
Low + Lower middle (117) 15 17 20 14 37 79 98 98 
+Upper middle also (154) 24 26 30 19 43 84 100 100 
+High-income non-OECD 
+ Korea (182) 34 37 32 22 47 86 100 100 
 
                                                 
12 For details and data sources, see Melchior (2005c), which also contains more detail on 
options for country classification. 
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Hence LDCs constitute 0.5-0.7% of the world economy but 13-17% of the 
world’s poor.13 If we add only 11 more countries to obtain the low-income 
category, we include e.g. India, Pakistan and Nigeria, and all shares 
multiply by four, approximately. Using a 1000$ BNI per capita threshold 
instead, we include China, and the shares are substantially raised. Adding 
the whole lower middle income group (including e.g. Brazil), almost all 
the world’s poor are included, and the share of the world economy is 14-
20%. With a very broad definition of developing countries, they include 
22-34% of the world economy. 
For classifying countries with respect to GSP, income may be 
supplemented by other criteria. For example, the International 
Development Association (IDA) provides a list of countries that may 
receive loans from the World Bank on particularly favourable terms. This 
list largely corresponds with the low-income group, but also includes 
some severely indebted countries such as Indonesia.  
Given that LDCs constitute a modest part of the developing world, and 
since the impact of trade measures has been limited for these countries, an 
excessive focus on LDCs should be avoided.  This implication it not that 
LDCs are less important or that they should not be helped, but that we 
should have a broader approach. Other groups should also be considered 
as candidates for extended market access. For promoting development and 
reducing poverty, trade policy should be used where it is most efficient for 
these purposes.  
 
40. Several developing countries export agricultural goods 
 
A visualization of what GSP for different country groups may imply in 
terms of import competition, is provided in Diagram 16, which shows the 
cumulative share of world agricultural exports for the developing 
countries. In the diagram, countries are ranked by their income level (BNI 
per capita, with the poorest to the left). 
 
                                                 
13 The shares of poverty may be slightly higher since data coverage is more limited for 
the LDCs; we therefore write “more the 4/5” in the sub-heading. 
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Diagram 16: The developing countries' share of world 
agricultural exports, 2002
Based on data for 133 countries (104 shown)
Data sources: World Development Indicators 2003, COMTRADE.
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Brazil, China and Argentina are the largest developing country exporters 
of agriculture, but the curve increased steadily until an income level 
around 5000$, so there are many exporters, especially among low-income 
and lower middle income countries. Among the upper middle income 
countries (3036-9385$ with 2002 data), there are some large exporters but 
not many. Given that Mexico has a free trade agreement with Norway, the 
issue of GSP for agriculture is how many countries along this ladder that 
we are willing to let in. As seen from Table 5, all the groups have 
legitimate needs in terms of development and poverty. According to the 
data underlying Diagram 16, Botswana and Namibia are both lower 
middle income countries. According to the most recent World Bank 
classification (summer 2005), Botswana has even climbed up to the upper 
middle income group. 
 
41. Differentiation between groups of developing countries is possible 
 
While the EU and the USA practices GSP with considerable 
differentiation beyond LDCs (see Melchior 2005a), the Norwegian system 
is simpler with the special treatment of Botswana and Namibia as the only 
special category. According to a recent WTO report (see Melchior 2005c 
for a discussion), differentiation between different groups of developing 
countries is possible, but has to be based on objective criteria so that any 
developing country fulfilling these criteria  is eligible. We interpret this 
decision in the sense that pure income criteria, or criteria related to e.g. 
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debt, are acceptable – although we are not in the position to issue a legal 
guaranty.  
 
42. “Mega-preferences” to LDCs only should be avoided 
 
According to Melchior (2005c) “mega-preferences” only to the LDCs 
should be avoided, in order to (i) stimulate competition among countries 
and between traders, to avoid non-sustainable trade (and subsequent 
adjustment problems) as well as monopoly situations; (ii) to avoid that 
better market access for other developing countries is hampered by 
problems of “preference erosion”; (iii) to provide market access to 
developing countries with a larger supply capacity; (iv) to soften the 
impact of thresholds and group delineations that are always to some extent 
arbitrary. Fairness is also a valid reason for improving market access 
beyond LDCs. 
Currently, worries that multilateral liberalisation will undermine the 
preferences of LDCs and (for the EU) the ACP countries threaten to delay 
important reforms in the EU sugar regime, as well as tariff reductions in 
the Doha Round. We argue that GSP systems should be designed in order 
to avoid, to the extent possible, this kind of “trade policy lock-in” in the 
future. 
 
43. A possible scheme of differentiation under GSP. 
 
A possible option is to have the following hierarchy of preferences: 
- Step 1: LDC, low income and IDA countries. 
- Step 2: Other lower middle income countries, and severely indebted 
upper middle income countries.14 
- Step 3: Other upper middle income countries. 
The economic magnitude of these groups is evident from table 5, and the 
major suppliers involved, are evident from Diagram 16.15 For Norway, the 
implication of such a scheme would be: 
- To include Russia, and the FSU in the GSP scheme, based on their 
income levels. 
- To eliminate the special treatment of Botswana and Namibia. Trade 
arrangements for these countries may also be taken care of in the 
planned FTA with SACU. 
- According to this approach, Hong Kong, Korea and a number of high-
income non-OECD countries would lose their GSP benefits. On the 
other hand, the majority of these countries do not export much 
agriculture and if MFN tariffs are reduced to zero for all 
manufacturing, their market access will be secured. Hence zero MFN 
tariffs for manufacturing is important in order to avoid negative 
political reactions to this approach to differentiation. 
                                                 
14 An example of an upper middle income country that is severely indebted, is Argentina. 
15 See Melchior (2005c) for more information on the IDA category. 
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44. For agriculture, GSP has to be adapted to the outcome of the WTO 
negotiations  
 
If the “Harbinson proposal” in the WTO negotiations is implemented, 
illustrative calculations suggest that it may lead to an average cut of 
around 40% in Norway’s MFN applied tariffs. This is however uncertain, 
and depends on e.g. to what extent sensitive products may be kept out, or 
whether a tariff cap is decided (a tariff maximum). A tariff cap at 100% 
has recently been proposed, however with strong opposition from 
Norway.16 It is also unclear whether specific tariffs will be converted to ad 
valorem. Mandatory increases in minimum access (currently 5% of 
consumption) might be expected. The future design of GSP will depend on 
these elements.  
Another issue is whether reforms in GSP may be used in order to 
fulfill liberalisation requirements in agriculture that follow from the WTO 
negotiations. It is likely that this will be an element, but the specific results 
will determine how this may be done. Since we do not have the answer on 
these issues now, we have to present options that have to be adjusted to 
the WTO outcome.  
 
45. As the highest GSP tariff level for agriculture, ad valorem tariffs 
could be introduced, and mega-tariffs as well as “water in the tariffs” 
should be eliminated for all developing countries. 
 
For agriculture, gains will be limited if e.g. the mega-tariff of 4892% AVE 
(for meal and pellets of meat and meat offal, HS 2301 1000) is reduced by 
50%. GSP should offer a real increase in market access rather than cuts 
above the prohibitive levels. 
For the upper middle income countries, ad valorem tariffs could be 
introduced for all agricultural goods. In all these tariffs, the “water in the 
tariff” should be taken out, for tariff lines where it exists. This should lead 
to tariff levels substantially below many of the AVEs that we have 
calculated. As noted, the level also has to be considered in the light of the 
outcome of the current WTO negotiations. 
Switching from specific to ad valorem tariffs implies that products in 
the lower price range may be imported. In the current system, the high 
specific tariffs tend to promote imports of only high-priced items. For 
example, the WTO beef quotas are used to import containers of tenderloin 
from Brazil and some other countries. While there has been talk about 
Norwegian agriculture producing high-value added “niche products”, the 
specific tariffs may generate more competition in exactly these segments. 
                                                 
16 See press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 July 2005, “G10-landene 
fastholder motstanden mot tolltak i WTO-forhandlingene”. 
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This, in addition to predictability and transparency, is an argument for a 
change to AV tariffs in the GSP scheme. 
 
46. The GSP tariffs for agricultural goods may then be reduced further 
in two steps; one for the poorest and another for the second poorest 
countries. 
 
The scaling of tariff reductions is then a political issue. In the report, we 
have presented a ranking across products and across country groups. One 
should aim at zero tariffs for all products for the low-income group, and 
partial reductions for the second poorest countries. Big suppliers in the 
lower middle income group such as Brazil would not obtain free trade, but 
still be able to sell their products in Norway.  
Given that GSP reforms may affect employment in agriculture, 
reforms may be phased in over time. Due to the substantial amount of 
“water in the tariffs”, for example, it is difficult to foresee the quantitative 
impact of liberalisation for many products. Importers are willing to pay 
tariffs + auction quota prices at 140% for some types of meat, but for other 
products, the prohibitive tariff may be much lower. Due to the uncertainty, 
stepwise introduction of reforms may be warranted. This will also vary 
across products: Liberalisation of canned peas may require no transition 
period, but complete opening of the grain markets do. 
An issue is to what extent tariffs should be supplemented by tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs). If TRQs  are “successful”, with competition among 
importers and meaningful quota prices, their result is to collect a new form 
of tariff, to the treasury.  Concerns for predictability and a simpler trade 
regime suggest that TRQs should preferably be phased out and replaced 
by ordinary ad valorem tariffs. TRQs could however be used selectively in 
order to make transition gradual. It would then be important that quotas 
are large enough to allow commercial quantities from several large 
importers. Some of the current TRQs are, according to importers, far too 
small for this purpose. 
 
47. A stylized example of agricultural liberalization. 
 
Table 6 provides an illustration of a possible GSP regime in agriculture, 
for different products: 
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Table 6: Illustration of a possible design of GSP 
Product examples Country 
group: Peas Feedstuff Meat Milk 
Low income 
+ IDA + 
LDC 
0 0 0 0 
Other lower 
middle 
100% 
tariff cut 
50% 
tariff cut 
30% 
tariff cut 
10% 
tariff cut 
Upper 
middle 
Ad valorem tariffs with modest liberalization beyond 
“post-Doha” effective level  
Rich MFN applied tariffs after the Doha Round 
 
The ranking of products has to be studied further, in more detail. As an 
unprinted appendix we provide a list of 228 products where (i) the current 
GSP tariff is non-zero, and (ii) developing countries have a share above 
20% of world exports at the 6-digit classification level. This list includes 
products from a number of agricultural chapters. 
The figures presented in Table 6 are merely illustrations; the scale of 
tariff reduction is a political decision. Hence the purpose of Table 6 is to 
illustrate a possible structure of a renewed GSP system for agriculture. In 
the table, there are no TRQs since the GSP system should to the largest 
possible extent be based on ad valorem tariffs. In case this is politically 
impossible, some of the liberalization could be undertaken in the form of 
substantially enlarged TRQs. The current TRQs should also be reviewed, 
and we have included peas in the table as an example of an item that could 
be liberalised and the current TRQ abandoned. To the extent that TRQs 
are maintained, the need for allowing commercially viable quantities is 
also crucial. According to importers, some of the current TRQs are too 
small in this respect. 
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Administrative features 
 
48. Norway should cooperate with the EU in order to improve rules of 
origin. 
 
For clothing, the “double processing” requirement is a restriction that 
limits the export possibilities of GSP beneficiaries; especially small 
countries without their own production of yarn and fabrics. As noted 
above, zero MFN tariffs for clothing is the most expeditious way off 
eliminating this restriction. As long as this is not the situation, ways 
should be explored to alleviate the problem. Due to the rules for 
cumulation, Norway has to coordinate steps in this field with the EU. In 
the current system, Laos has obtained a special exception on rules of 
origin. An interesting example internationally is the Apparel Protocol of 
AGOA (the U.S. preferential scheme African Growth and Opportunity 
Act), which relaxes the RO for AGOA beneficiaries. Norway should work 
with the EU in order to simplify the current rules and make them less 
restrictive. In principle, a single processing requirement could be 
introduced, or the value criteria in the new EU system could be adapted so 
that single processing is allowed. Furthermore, the documentation 
requirements could be simplified, by the extended use of self-declaration, 
as already proposed by the Norwegian Customs and Excise. This 
procedure is used for small shipments already.  
Rules of origin constitute a technically complex issue that can take the 
breath out of any generalist. Nevertheless it is quite important in trade 
policy and may have severe consequences for the trade of poor countries. 
In Norway, RO are mainly handled as a technical matter, by the 
Norwegian Customs and Excise. While we do not question their expertise 
in the field, we recommend that the relevant ministries in Norway give 
more priority to the issue. Facing an important reform in the EU that 
Norway probably has to follow, Norway should examine the issue and 
present its views. 
 
50. It should also be controlled whether the current rules are followed. 
 
While the ambition should be to simplify and liberalise RO, it has to be 
controlled that there is no trade deflection and that certificates of origin are 
not falsified or issued inconsistently, e.g. in regimes with high corruption. 
According to Norwegian import statistics, imports from Bangladesh have 
e.g. increased sharply after 2000, while according to Bangladesh export 
statistics, this has not been the case (see Melchior 2005c). We do not 
claim that there has been corruption in the issuance of certificates of origin 
in Bangladesh, but mention this as an example of procedures for control: 
Check the consistency of statistics, and check discrepancies to explain the 
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gaps. According to Norwegian Customs and Excise, implementation of 
RO is currently not a major problem. It may be added, however, that if the 
paper and stamp is right, Norwegian authorities have little possibility to 
check that they were appropriately issued.  
 
51. Erroneous classification may be an increasing problem. 
 
It is well known that with tariffs that vary sharply across individual 
products, it may be tempting for importers to change a digit here and there 
in the classification number, and thereby avoid tariffs. According to 
Norwegian Customs and Excise, such cases constitute an increasing share 
of problems faced in the customs administration. A technique for 
controlling this, in addition to standard sampling, is again to compare 
import statistics in Norway with export statistics in the country of origin. 
Some research in the field confirms the presence of such practices, using 
this type of data (Fisman and Wei 2001).  
 
52. Several beneficiaries do not use the Norwegian GSP system 
 
The beneficiary country must have completed certain formalities, e.g. by 
providing information about competent authorities, stamps etc.. This is 
probably not a big burden, but its fulfillment is not automatic. Currently in 
Norway, the statistics are as follows: 
 
Table 7: Countries that completed formalities for using Norway’s GSP system, 2005 
 Ordinary GSP GSP for LDCs 
 
Number 
of 
countries 
Share of 
trade 
entitled, 
% 
Average 
imports 
(mill. 
USD) 
2004 
Number 
of 
countries 
Share of 
trade 
entitled, 
% 
Average 
imports 
(mill. 
USD) 
2004 
Completed 
formalities 67 92.4 77.2 29 86.0 3.6 
Not completed 39 7.6 1.0 20 14.0 0.9 
Total 106 100  49 100  
Source: Norwegian Customs Tariff, internet version April 2005, trade data from COMTRADE. 
 
Hence approximately 60% of the countries entitled to GSP had actually 
fulfilled the administrative formalities. 39 countries entitled to ordinary 
GSP, and 20 countries entitled to LDC-GSP had, by April 2005, not 
completed the formalities. Norway’s imports from the countries not 
fulfilling GSP formalities were however small; with average imports in 
2004 at one million USD.  
There are several possible reasons why countries have not completed 
the formalities, for example 
- they did not know about the Norwegian GSP system 
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- they only exported goods for which tariffs are zero, or so low that 
there would be little to gain from GSP 
- they did not have the administrative capacity 
- Norway is a too marginal market 
- they knew that they would not fulfil the RO requirements for goods 
they could export.. 
Most of these reasons probably mattered. We will not make any attempt to 
quantify the importance of each. It is not necessarily a “scandal” that 
countries have not used their rights under the Norwegian GSP system – for 
a small country far away from Norway it may be rational to drop this, if 
trade is small or the trade potential is limited for goods for which GSP 
matters. Recent studies have also shown that if the preference margin is 
small, exporters may choose to export under MFN tariffs in order to avoid 
the transaction costs related to GSP (OECD 2005). If e.g. countries do not 
export clothing or agricultural goods, they have no reason to bother about 
Norwegian GSP. On the other hand, it is important that information about 
the Norwegian system is good enough.  
Over time, it seems that the LDCs have become better with respect to 
completing the formalities: In 1993, only around half (25 of 49) had done 
so. At that time, 72 ordinary developing countries have sent the 
documents; i.e. some decline.17 This may be explained by the reasons 
above.  
 
53. Information in English about GSP could be improved. 
 
In English, a brochure is available. This has not always been the case in 
the past, and is an improvement. On the other hand, the customs tariff is 
not available in English, and this limits the transparency of the system and 
implies that exporters have to rely on importers for all information. For the 
allocation of rents and the bargaining position of developing country 
exporters, such information is important. The information technology 
systems of Norwegian Customs and Excise will be changed from the fall 
of 2005, and it is being considered whether an English version of the 
customs tariff should be made available later. This would be an advantage, 
by increasing the accessibility of information on tariffs and GSP. English-
language tariff files are sent every year to WTO and UNCTAD and 
thereby already exist, and it should be possible to make this available on 
the internet. 
Information about GSP via diplomatic channels and internationally 
accessible websites should be reconsidered. In particular, internet-based 
information should play a more important role. For example, UNCTAD 
could create a portal where links to nation-specific information is 
accessible. UNCTAD has made useful handbooks on some GSP systems 
(not the Norwegian, though). Given the frequent changes in GSP systems 
                                                 
17 Based on Norwegian Customs and Excise, 1993, Generelle tollpreferanser for import 
av varer fra utviklingsland. 
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and the multitude of schemes, an idea is that UNCTAD puts more 
emphasis on developing a system where web links play a more important 
role. We have not considered such options in detail, and just raise this as a 
possible idea. 
We are unable to tell whether lacking information is a reason why 
some countries do not fill in the forms that are needed in order to obtain 
GSP.  
 
54. Strange information practices for grain and oilseeds. 
 
When zero tariffs without quotas for all goods were introduced for the 
LDCs from July 2002, the last cluster of products to be included was 
grains and oilseeds. There is however a surveillance system, with 
deadlines for application three times a year, and a safeguard clause that 
may be invoked if the “market balance” is threatened. For e.g. wheat (HS 
1001), the ordinary tariff is 2.13 NOK/kg, while for LDCs it is zero, 
subject to the surveillance system. There is in principle two ways of 
communicating this: (a) The tariff for LDCs is zero, but there is a 
surveillance system so that tariffs may…; or (b) The tariff for LDCs is 
2.13, but it may become zero if the importer applies… Most people would 
think that option (a) is the plausible one. This is the version in the GSP 
brochure, and in various communications in Norwegian from the 
Norwegian Agricultural Authority. Due to the latter, well-informed 
importers in the field will know that the tariff is zero. If a new trader 
checks the web-based customs tariff, however, he or she will read that the 
tariff for LDCs is actually 2.13. There is no footnote or reservation telling 
that the tariff is actually zero. According to the Norwegian Customs and 
Excise, this is a technical matter since zero tariffs are only granted upon 
application. We still consider the practice to be strange, and that it implies 
a risk of wrong information. From interviews, we also noted that some 
importers were not sure that all tariffs for LDCs were zero. 
 
55. The safeguards for LDCs should be reformed 
 
In spite of substantial tariff preferences, LDCs are unable to sell much to 
Norway as well as other countries. If they ever succeed; should safeguards 
for grain and feedstuff then stop them immediately? As part of the GSP 
reforms, the current safeguard arrangement for LDCs should also be 
reviewed. Given that the threat from LDCs is limited, it should preferably 
be removed. Removing the tri-annual deadlines and having automatic 
licensing by the date of application would also be a step forward. 
 
56. In agriculture, the tariff system should be made more transparent 
 
The current tariff system in agriculture has some features that could be 
simplified in order to facilitate trade. First, administrative tariff changes 
over time actually amounts to a variable-levy system that creates 
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uncertainty for traders. Importers have start-up costs in new trades, and 
have to calculate how much to invest. This is particularly true for poor and 
remote countries, where start-up costs may be higher. Uncertainty about 
tariffs may deter entry in such markets. It might be better with tariffs that 
are not changed frequently by administrative decisions. Second, the 
current system of individual tariff reduction by administrative decisions is 
also not so transparent: Although we can read from official documents 
about the number of tariff decisions, their impact is less visible. Some 
importers had also experienced that the notice as well as the duration for 
tariff reductions were too short, so it was impossible to benefit from them. 
It would be an advantage to eliminate this practice to the extent possible, 
and introduce permanently lower tariffs for products where such 
administrative tariff suspensions are important. With large tariff wedges, 
there are also large values involved, and it would be an advantage to make 
this system more transparent. In this respect, the auction system in 
agriculture should be commended for its transparency, although collusive 
behavior may be a problem in some cases.  
If the frequent administrative changes in agricultural tariffs are 
abandoned, a possibility is also to transfer the administration of 
agricultural tariffs to Norwegian Customs and Excise, from the Norwegian 
Agricultural Authority.  
 
57. Some problems also exist with RO in agriculture. 
 
Compared to clothing, where the double processing requirement is a 
severe restriction RO are generally not such a severe problem in 
agriculture. Some problems nevertheless exist. According to some 
importers, a considerable share of food imports from developing countries 
passes through entrepots such as the Netherlands, where they may be 
repacked. RO are mostly clear about which forms of handling of the goods 
that are allowed, but some borderline problems exist and there have been 
conflicts in the field. The importers perceived the RO and administrative 
requirements as a burden that they had to spend resources in order to learn 
and master. While some firms reported problems, others stated that their 
requirements for documentation of origin were generally followed, and 
they did not make deals with firms that did not follow these requirements 
strictly. It may be the case that flowers from developing countries are re-
bundled with flowers from other origins, but we do not have specific 
information about problems with GSP origin in these cases. 
 
58. Veterinary control and the EU system 
 
EU veterinary rules imply that only some countries are approved as e.g. 
meat exporters, and this also limits Norway’s possibilities under GSP. 
This has also limited imports of honey from LDCs. The message from 
importers is pretty clear: Veterinary issues is a major problem with LDCs, 
but mostly manageable for ordinary developing countries although it 
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requires an effort. Given the importance of EU regulations for Norway’s 
imports from poor countries, the EU decision-making process should be 
followed closely. It is generally important to secure that veterinary 
decisions are never unduly influenced by business lobbies with an interest 
for protection.  
 
59. The tariff structure should be as simple as possible 
 
For a reform of the GSP system, specific considerations have to be made 
for individual products, beyond the scope of this study. Whatever 
considerations, however, it should be an objective to have a simple tariff 
structure, instead of a pattern where all tariffs are different.  
 
60. International harmonization and binding rules should be pursued. 
 
In Melchior (2005a) it is shown how a variety of different preferences 
creates a “spaghetti bowl” of regimes. For GSP, it may be a non-tariff 
barrier in itself if all countries develop their own rules, and these rules 
vary across export countries. Harmonisation of rules internationally is 
therefore a good idea, also for GSP. 
The need for internationally accepted rules is also one reason why we 
have not pursued the idea of linking GSP to the adherence to particular 
governance criteria. One of the critiques of GSP has been that industrial 
countries use it to promote particular interests. Ôzden and Reinhardt 
(2004a) maintains that the USA has been particularly active in this sense, 
and the new GSP regime of the EU also provides better preferences for 
countries that have ratified a list of international standards, on labour and 
human rights and the environment. We have not proposed that Norway 
should make its own list; it seems preferable that such clauses should be 
better coordinated internationally.  
Otherwise, it is a possibility that WTOs regulations on GSP become 
further clarified. GSP-like arrangement in other fields than tariffs may also 
become more important over time, and should be addressed by the WTO. 
As an example, intellectual property rights might be less strict for the 
poorest countries, e.g. with shorter patent duration.  
Finally, a possibility is that tariff regimes that differentiate between 
groups of countries according to development levels could be negotiated 
in the WTO and become binding. This is however not politically feasible 
at the moment, and it is therefore easier to make a “development-friendly” 
tariff system via GSP. This is the purpose of the proposals presented here.  
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Appendix A: The background for the project. 
 
In two previous reports to the Storting; St.meld. 19, 2003-2004 (“the 
globalisation report”) and St.meld. nr. 35, 2003-2004 (“the development 
report”)18, the Norwegian Government had given signals relevant to 
assessment of the GSP system. The assessment of the GSP system was 
signalled in the development report: “As a supplement to the general tariff 
reductions resulting from the new round of negotiations in the WTO, it 
will be in the interest of developing countries that we, from the Norwegian 
side, undertake further improvements in the GSP system. The Government 
will therefore initiate an assessment of the GSP system in order to 
consider whether it is possible to simplify and improve the current 
regulations…. A change in the number of beneficiary countries will be 
considered; whether developing countries outside the LDC group should 
be offered larger tariff reductions than they obtain in the current system; 
and whether the administrative requirements and routines should be 
simplified. The assessment will be seen in context with the current WTO 
negotiations.” (p. 45) The development report (ibid.) referred to, and the 
“globalisation report” (p. 37) reiterated the earlier stated purpose of 
eliminating the remaining tariffs for manufactured goods – stated in the 
budget proposition in 2002 (St.prp. nr. 1, 2002-2003, B.innst.S. nr. 1, 
2002-2003). Given that these remaining tariffs mainly apply  to exports 
from developing countries, concerns for development was a main 
argument. In the globalisation report, it was also stated “The Government 
will take into consideration agricultural products of special interest to 
developing countries as part of the ongoing round of negotiations as well 
as through improvements in the Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP).” (p. 38) “The Government believes the time has come for 
considering more closely the concept of development in the WTO so that 
special arrangements better serve the poorest countries.” (p. 44) “… secure 
that import protection still safeguards Norwegian production in vital areas, 
and at the same time give developing countries outside the LDC group 
better trade conditions in the form of some increase in market access for 
agricultural goods” (p. 48).  
The terms of reference for the study19 specified aspects to be covered 
by the study. It is stated that “It is particularly the issues related to 
beneficiary countries, including questions concerning phasing-
out/graduation, preference margins, administrative routines and rules of 
origin that are relevant elements to be considered in the assessment of the 
Norwegian system. In addition, an introductory examination of more 
principal issues should be undertaken, including: 
- To what extent do preference systems promote development, 
compared to general liberalisation that apply to all countries? 
                                                 
18 See references, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003, 2004) for complete titles. 
19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, Konkurransegrunnlag til kontrakt vedrørende 
gjennomgang av den norske GSP-ordningen (2000/00782).  
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- Is development better promoted by giving free market access only to 
the LDCs, or should similar market access be granted also to low-
income countries or all developing countries? 
- Can preference arrangements promote or hinder trade liberalisation 
within and between developing countries? 
- To what extent is erosion of preference margins a real problem for 
developing countries? 
- Do preferences generally contribute to a lock-in of countries’ 
industrial structure and ensuing problems of adjustment, or to the 
development of competitive industries?” 
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Appendix B: Names of persons interviewed 
 
Assistant Commercial Attaché Ganef Judawati, Permanent Mission of the 
Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations and other international 
organisations, Geneva 
Commercial Attache Alfons Samosir, Permanent Mission of the Republic 
of Indonesia to the United Nations and other international organisations, 
Geneva 
Economic Minister Md. Motaher Hussain, Permanent Mission of 
Bangladesh, Geneva 
Hans-Peter Werner, Counsellor, Development Division, WTO, Geneva 
Harish Iyer, Economic Affairs Officer, Development Division, WTO, 
Geneva 
Jiang Liyong, Attache, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of 
China to the World Trade Organisation, Geneva 
Patrick Rata, Counsellor, External Relations Division, WTO, Geneva 
Pierre Encontre, Economic Affairs Officer, Special Programme for Least 
Developed, Landlocked and Island Developing Countries, UNCTAD, 
Geneva 
Said El Hachimi, Counsellor, External Relations Division, WTO, Geneva 
Sjur Klætte, Norwegian Customs and Excise 
Stefano Inama, Senior Expert, UNCTAD, Geneva 
Svein Grønlie, Norwegian Customs and Excise 
Ulf Hoberg, Norwegian Customs and Excise 
Xuewei Feng, Legal Affairs Officer, WTO, Geneva 
 
In addition, representatives of 27 Norwegian importing firms were 
interviewed. These were interviewed under anonymity and their names are 
not included.  
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Appendix C: The Norwegian GSP system: A brief chronology 
 
Norway was among the first industrial countries to establish a GSP 
system, in September 1971 (effective from 1 October 1971). For 
manufactured goods, a characteristic feature has been the use of complete 
tariff elimination for goods covered by the system, and not partial 
reductions, as more commonly used by the EU and the USA. For 
manufacturing, the product coverage has been extensive from the very 
beginning, and the exceptions – mainly in the field of textiles and clothing 
– were listed in a so-called “negative list”. Clothing products were also 
subject to import quotas. These were quite restrictive in the 1980s, but 
gradually lifted during the late 1980s and the 1990s. With binding quotas, 
GSP might have no impact on trade but transfer tariff revenue from the 
government to exporters or importers. 
The negative list has been reduced over time. In the 1980s, some 
products were added on extended negative lists for Bulgaria, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Macao and Romania. These extended lists were not motivated by 
“graduation” (more advanced countries losing their benefits); they were 
due to the transition from a system with extensive import controls (for 
Korea, Romania, Bulgaria), or due to protection interests (Hong Kong, 
Macao).  
In general, GSP benefits have been withdrawn when Norway has 
negotiated free trade agreements with countries concerned. For example, 
FTAs with Bulgaria and Romania were implemented in 1993, and GSP as 
well as the extended negative lists were withdrawn. 
For agriculture, the GSP system before the implementation of the 
Uruguay Round results was based on a “positive list” of products with 
GSP. Norwegian agricultural protection in this period was based on 
quantitative restrictions, so tariffs were lower than post-UR. The UR led to 
“tariffication”, and high tariffs were introduced. With this system, GSP 
implied partial tariff reductions, plus tariff cuts within tariff rate quotas 
(TRQs). A particular feature of the Norwegian system has been that 
Botswana and Namibia have been treated “almost” as LDCs. Botswana 
was one of the original LDCs but graduated during the early 1990s. 
Namibia was a candidate but never obtained LDC status.20  
The LDCs obtained zero tariffs for all goods (agriculture and 
manufactures) already in 1976.21 After the UR, however, tariffs were re-
introduced for grain, feedstuff and oilseeds. From 1 July 2002, these tariffs 
were again eliminated, however subject to a surveillance system for these 
goods. Under this system, importers have to apply for an import license in 
advance, currently with deadlines three times a year.  
Throughout the history of the Norwegian GSP system, there have been 
several changes in product coverage. The product coverage of the system 
                                                 
20 See e.g. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/45/198, 71st plenary meeting, 21 
December 1990. 
21 See e.g. Eide (1980). 
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at various points in time is documented in GSP handbooks for various 
periods. Important changes occurred  
- in 1995, with the new system for agriculture 
- in 1998, when the rules of origin were partially harmonised with the 
EU system 
- in 2000, when the product coverage for manufacturing was 
considerably extended. 
In addition, there are continuous changes in the list of countries that have 
implemented the system by providing documentation about certifying 
authorities etc. Useful sources of information about the GSP system, in 
addition to the GSP handbooks, are 
- numerous communications from Customs and excise Norway on the 
implementation 
- the annual budget propositions from the Ministry of Finance, on tariffs 
and taxes 
- propositions to the Parliament on particular issues (e.g. agriculture in 
1995) 
- in the TRAINS database of UNCTAD, Norwegian GSP tariffs are 
included for some years. 
Over time, the Norwegian GSP system has been subject to regular 
scrutiny by Norwegian researchers:  
- Eide (1980, 4) concludes that “GSP was granted for goods for which 
the development potential was limited and the impact of the system 
over the first 5-6 years has been minimal”. He also noted that for items 
on the “negative list”, GSP beneficiaries faced higher tariffs than 
EFTA and (being implemented at the time) the EU. He advised that the 
“negative list” for manufactured goods should be reduced. 
- Grooss et al. (1991) provided an overview of Norwegian import 
regulations at the time, and e.g. noted that importers in agriculture 
were ”satisfied” in spite of the quota restrictions. The authors 
interpreted this as an indication to the effect that the importers could 
gain some of the rent created by quotas. 
- Econ Energi (1995) examined the scope for increased agricultural 
imports from developing countries in the post-UR system. They 
assumed that full GSP for agriculture would have dramatic 
consequences for Norwegian agriculture, and therefore was not 
politically feasible. On imports from LDCs they concluded (p. 259) “If 
the LDCs are the only ones to obtain significant tariff preferences, the 
short-run impact on imports of agricultural goods from developing 
countries will be modest. The LDCs have a limited export potential for 
most of the goods where Norwegian tariffs will be high under the new 
GATT agreement. Quality requirements and badly functioning 
distribution systems will also limit exports to Norway. There are 
however some exceptions; i.e. goods for which imports from the LDCs 
are expected to increase due to tariff elimination. Examples of such 
exceptions are forage products from African countries and some 
processed agricultural goods.” For developing countries in general, the 
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analysis concluded that the potential impact of GSP was greatest for 
forage products, which are supplied by a number of developing 
countries and consist of a large number of different products that may 
be easily substituted. According to Econ, the Norwegian forage price 
might be cut by 60%. This would have a positive impact on animal 
farming, although Norwegian cereal production would be reduced. 
- Wiig et al. (2002) considered the import potential under GSP for 
Norway’s main aid recipients.  They observed that 80% of the imports 
from aid cooperation recipients subject to GSP treatment originated in 
China, and therefore raised the question about whether the Norwegian 
GSP was too broadly focused (p.47). The study also contains a 
comprehensive examination of import possibilities for particular 
products, supported by interviews with importers. According to the 
report, there was a considerable import potential particularly for 
textiles and agricultural goods. 
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Table D1: Utilisation of Norway’s GSP system for agriculture (HS 1-24) in 2002 
R
an
k 
GSP 
eligible 
as % of 
dutiable 
imports 
Imports 
received 
GSP, 
value 
%of 
dutiable 
imports 
received 
GSP 
Utili-
sation 
(received 
GSP/ 
eligible) 
Rest 
dutiable 
%share 
of import
value 
with 
GSP 
Cum. 
share Country 
 % Mill. NOK % % % % % 
SOUTH AFRICA 1 99 136.3 89 89 1 17.6 17.6 
ARGENTINA 2 100 86.1 71 71 1 11.1 28.7 
BRAZIL 3 88 74.2 42 48 2 9.6 38.3 
* NAMIBIA 4 100 62.7 99 99 0 8.1 46.3 
THAILAND 5 99 59.7 75 76 1 7.7 54.0 
CHINA 6 81 51.4 62 76 13 6.6 60.7 
CHILE 7 100 37.8 77 77 0 4.9 65.5 
* TANZANIA 8 100 28.5 100 100 0 3.7 69.2 
* BOTSWANA 9 100 28.0 100 100 0 3.6 72.8 
CYPRUS 10 100 22.9 100 100 0 3.0 75.8 
PHILIPPINES 11 99 21.8 94 95 1 2.8 78.6 
PAKISTAN 12 99 21.3 53 53 1 2.7 81.3 
KOREA 13 97 18.4 96 100 1 2.4 83.7 
KENYA 14 100 16.8 98 98 0 2.2 85.9 
INDONESIA 15 98 15.0 97 98 1 1.9 87.8 
INDIA 16 93 12.5 58 63 2 1.6 89.4 
EGYPT 17 100 9.1 64 64 0 1.2 90.6 
GUATEMALA 18 100 7.9 93 93 0 1.0 91.6 
PERU 19 5 7.5 4 93 43 1.0 92.6 
* ZAMBIA 20 100 6.6 100 100 0 0.9 93.4 
COSTA RICA 21 100 6.0 82 82 0 0.8 94.2 
COLOMBIA 22 100 5.2 68 68 0 0.7 94.9 
* YEMEN 23 100 4.9 66 66 0 0.6 95.5 
* ETHIOPIA 24 100 4.7 100 100 0 0.6 96.1 
ZIMBABWE 25 100 3.4 95 95 0 0.4 96.6 
ECUADOR 26 99 3.4 97 98 0 0.4 97.0 
MALAYSIA 27 92 3.2 91 99 5 0.4 97.4 
* UGANDA 28 100 3.2 100 100 0 0.4 97.8 
HONG KONG 29 43 2.5 32 75 38 0.3 98.1 
IRAN 30 98 2.1 49 50 2 0.3 98.4 
 
LDCs 100 134.5 99 100 0 17.3  
All GSP beneficiaries 82 775.4 64 77 6 100.0  
Note: Based on calculations undertaken by Statistics Norway. 
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Table D2: Utilisation of Norway’s GSP system for manufacturing (HS 25-99) in 2002 
R
an
k 
GSP 
eligible 
as % of 
dutiable 
imports 
Imports 
received 
GSP, 
value 
%of 
dutiable 
imports 
received 
GSP 
Utili-
sation 
(received 
GSP/ 
eligible) 
Rest 
dutiable 
%share 
of import
value 
with 
GSP 
Cum. 
share Country 
No. % Mill. NOK % % % % % 
CHINA 1 72 3027.8 58 80 10 69.5 69.5 
* BANGLADESH 2 100 216.0 81 81 0 5.0 74.4 
INDIA 3 59 202.3 43 73 26 4.6 79.1 
HONG KONG 4 62 161.4 42 67 15 3.7 82.8 
KOREA, REP.  5 72 142.8 61 85 4 3.3 86.1 
THAILAND 6 58 101.1 44 76 12 2.3 88.4 
PAKISTAN 7 60 88.2 54 90 25 2.0 90.4 
VIETNAM 8 44 75.6 28 64 39 1.7 92.1 
INDONESIA 9 43 60.3 33 77 16 1.4 93.5 
SINGAPORE 10 97 49.0 93 96 0 1.1 94.7 
MALAYSIA 11 85 38.5 67 79 1 0.9 95.5 
BAHRAIN 12 100 34.1 100 100 0 0.8 96.3 
SRI LANKA 13 91 31.4 60 66 7 0.7 97.0 
IRAN 14 100 27.8 68 68 0 0.6 97.7 
TUNISIA 15 42 19.7 21 49 46 0.5 98.1 
* LAO PDR 16 100 19.6 92 92 0 0.5 98.6 
PHILIPPINES 17 59 9.4 42 72 2 0.2 98.8 
EGYPT 18 81 8.0 64 79 5 0.2 99.0 
MACAU 19 48 7.4 19 40 50 0.2 99.1 
BRAZIL 20 42 5.5 37 88 2 0.1 99.3 
SAUDI ARABIA 21 100 4.7 80 80 0 0.1 99.4 
MAURITIUS 22 48 4.4 43 90 46 0.1 99.5 
SOUTH AFRICA 23 64 4.4 33 53 1 0.1 99.6 
LEBANON 24 82 2.4 80 98 9 0.1 99.6 
CYPRUS 25 99 1.8 65 66 1 0.0 99.7 
* NEPAL 26 100 1.6 81 81 0 0.0 99.7 
MALTA 27 26 1.4 14 54 16 0.0 99.7 
PERU 28 19 1.4 16 81 13 0.0 99.8 
COLOMBIA 29 95 1.3 71 75 0 0.0 99.8 
ECUADOR 30 93 1.1 86 93 3 0.0 99.8 
 
LDCs 100 239.4 69 69 0 5.5  
All GSP beneficiaries 69 4357.6 54 78 9 100.0  
Note: Based on calculations undertaken by Statistics Norway. 
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Table D3: Utilisation of Norway’s GSP system for all goods (HS 1-99) in 2002 
R
an
k 
GSP 
eligible 
as % of 
dutiable 
imports 
Imports 
received 
GSP, 
value 
%of 
dutiable 
imports 
received 
GSP 
Utili-
sation 
(received 
GSP/ 
eligible) 
Rest 
dutiable 
%share 
of import
value 
with 
GSP 
Cum. 
share Country 
No. % Mill. NOK % % % % % 
CHINA 1 72 3079.2 58 80 10 60.0 60.0 
* BANGLADESH 2 100 216.0 81 81 0 4.2 64.2 
INDIA 3 60 214.8 44 72 24 4.2 68.4 
HONG KONG 4 62 163.9 42 67 15 3.2 71.6 
KOREA, REP. 5 74 161.2 64 86 4 3.1 74.7 
THAILAND 6 68 160.8 52 76 10 3.1 77.8 
SOUTH AFRICA 7 97 140.6 84 87 1 2.7 80.6 
PAKISTAN 8 68 109.4 54 79 22 2.1 82.7 
ARGENTINA 9 99 86.4 71 71 0 1.7 84.4 
BRAZIL 10 84 79.7 42 49 2 1.6 86.0 
VIETNAM 11 45 77.5 29 64 38 1.5 87.5 
INDONESIA 12 47 75.3 38 81 15 1.5 88.9 
* NAMIBIA 13 100 62.7 99 99 0 1.2 90.2 
SINGAPORE 14 97 50.9 92 95 0 1.0 91.1 
MALAYSIA 15 85 41.7 69 80 1 0.8 92.0 
CHILE 16 100 38.1 76 76 0 0.7 92.7 
BAHRAIN 17 100 34.1 100 100 0 0.7 93.4 
SRI LANKA 18 91 32.4 60 66 6 0.6 94.0 
PHILIPPINES 19 79 31.1 68 86 2 0.6 94.6 
IRAN 20 100 29.9 66 66 0 0.6 95.2 
* BOTSWANA 21 100 28.9 100 100 0 0.6 95.7 
* TANZANIA 22 100 28.7 100 100 0 0.6 96.3 
CYPRUS 23 100 24.7 96 96 0 0.5 96.8 
TUNISIA 24 43 19.9 20 48 45 0.4 97.2 
* LAO PDR 25 100 19.6 92 92 0 0.4 97.6 
EGYPT 26 91 17.1 64 70 3 0.3 97.9 
KENYA 27 100 16.9 98 98 0 0.3 98.2 
PERU 28 5 8.9 5 91 39 0.2 98.4 
GUATEMALA 29 100 8.0 93 93 0 0.2 98.5 
MACAU 30 48 7.4 19 40 50 0.1 98.7 
 
LDCs 100 373.8 77 77 0 7.3  
All GSP beneficiaries 71 5133.0 55 78 8 100.0  
Note: Based on calculations undertaken by Statistics Norway. 
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Table D4: Norway’s imports of agriculture  
from developing countries, 1996-2004 
Mill. USD Share of total imports  in each chapter HS Brief description 
1996 2000 2004 1996 2000 2004 
01 Live animals 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.8
02 Meat and edible meat offal 7.7 6.4 27.5 18.8 23.4 42.5
04 Dairy prod; birds' eggs; natural honey 2.5 0.4 0.7 9.1 2.0 1.5
05 Products of animal origin, nes or 3.3 3.7 16.4 24.7 15.2 47.1
06 Live tree & other plant; bulb, root 7.3 8.7 11.5 8.0 9.6 8.3
07 Edible vegetables and certain roots 6.9 8.0 16.4 5.6 7.1 8.2
08 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus ..  107.4 81.3 166.6 40.6 36.7 42.8
09 Coffee, tea, matn and spices. 112.1 75.7 64.0 85.8 77.6 69.2
10 Cereals 6.7 16.3 22.3 5.2 35.6 30.2
11 Prod.mill.indust; malt; starches; 0.6 0.7 0.7 2.0 2.8 1.5
12 Oil seed, oleagi fruits; miscell gr 21.3 88.1 125.7 16.5 79.2 73.6
13 Lac; gums, resins & other vegetable 1.2 1.9 2.5 11.7 10.1 10.2
14 Vegetable plaiting materials; veget 0.3 0.2 0.3 34.2 19.7 48.1
15 Animal/veg fats & oils & their … 44.5 40.3 50.6 37.8 37.3 19.6
16 Prep of meat, fish or crustaceans, 6.6 7.4 8.5 11.7 15.0 10.5
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery. 4.8 6.3 6.2 3.1 5.9 4.5
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations. 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.4
19 Prep.of cereal, flour, starch/milk; 1.0 1.5 5.4 0.8 1.0 1.8
20 Prep of vegetable, fruit, nuts or o 44.0 29.7 32.5 38.1 28.2 22.6
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations. 3.2 1.3 3.5 2.6 1.0 1.7
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. 13.0 20.0 25.2 8.1 10.0 6.8
23 Residues & waste from the food indu 16.2 33.7 51.2 9.9 17.1 17.9
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 8.2 10.1 15.7 13.5 18.1 15.3
35 Albuminoidal subs; modified starches 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.9 1.2
Total - agriculture 419.2 442.1 654.9 18.6 21.8 19.3
Note: Data from COMTRADE. 
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Table D5: Norway’s imports of agriculture from  
the Least developed countries, 1996-2004 
1000 USD Share of total imports  in each chapter HS Brief description 
1996 2000 2004 1996 2000 2004 
01 Live animals   2 0.0 0.0 0.0
02 Meat and edible meat offal  2  0.0 0.0 0.0
04 Dairy prod; birds' eggs; natural honey  184 148 0.0 0.9 0.3
05 Products of animal origin, nes or    0.0 0.0 0.0
06 Live tree & other plant; bulb, root 2064 5793 6622 2.3 6.4 4.8
07 Edible vegetables and certain roots 24 16 104 0.0 0.0 0.1
08 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus ..  75 77 77 0.0 0.0 0.0
09 Coffee, tea, matn and spices. 4589 1535 2401 3.5 1.6 2.6
10 Cereals    0.0 0.0 0.0
11 Prod.mill.indust; malt; starches;    0.0 0.0 0.0
12 Oil seed, oleagi fruits; miscell gr 146 320 90 0.1 0.3 0.1
13 Lac; gums, resins & other vegetable 819 389 724 8.1 2.0 2.9
14 Vegetable plaiting materials; veget 0   0.0 0.0 0.0
15 Animal/veg fats & oils & their …  19 1 0.0 0.0 0.0
16 Prep of meat, fish or crustaceans, 2 95 108 0.0 0.2 0.1
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery. 1445 74 13 0.9 0.1 0.0
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations.    0.0 0.0 0.0
19 Prep.of cereal, flour, starch/milk; 4  0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20 Prep of vegetable, fruit, nuts or o 0  30 0.0 0.0 0.0
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations. 0   0.0 0.0 0.0
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar. 0 2  0.0 0.0 0.0
23 Residues & waste from the food indu    0.0 0.0 0.0
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 661 1344 1681 1.1 2.4 1.6
35 Albuminoidal subs; modified starches    0.0 0.0 0.0
Total - agriculture 9829 9852 12000 0.4 0.5 0.4
Note: Data from COMTRADE. 
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Appendix E: Abbreviations used 
 
Note: The list also includes some abbreviations used in other publications 
from the GSP project. 
 
ACP 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ca. 80)  involved in 
EUs Lomé and Cotonou Agreements that involve preferential 
schemes for  these countries 
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act (U.S. preferential scheme for African countries) 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ATC 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing made during the Uruguay 
Round of the WTO. Under ATC, textile quotas under the MFA 
agreement would be phased out during 1995-2005. 
ATPA 
Andean Trade Preference Act – U.S. trade preferences for the 
four Andean countries Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, in 
2001 overtaken by ATPDEA. 
ATPDEA 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act – includes 
U.S. trade preferences for the four Andean countries Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, see also ATPA 
AVE Ad Valorem Equivalent – term used when a specific tariff (e.g. 10 NOK per kilogram) is converted into % of the price 
CBERA Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (U.S. measures for the Caribbean). See also CBTPA. 
CBTPA Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act – extends U.S. preferences for the Caribbean beyond CBERA 
CIA, CWF Central Intelligence Agency (of the USA, useful data source on small countries), CIA World Factbook 
COMTRADE Trade database supplied by the United Nations Statistical Office 
CPIA 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment – procedure at the 
World Bank for analysing the quality of governance. Annual 
CPIA indexes are made for IDA countries. 
DAC The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD 
DC Developed Country (abbreviation used here to save space) 
EBA Everything But Arms (EU preference scheme for Least Developed Countries) 
ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social Council 
EEA European Economic Area – agreement between EU and Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein that extends the European Internal
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Market to these countries. 
EFTA European Free Trade Association  
EUR-Lex EU database on legal documents related to the EU 
EVI Economic Vulnerability Index – measure used as a criterion for making the list of Least Developed Countries 
FSU Former Soviet Union 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services – sub-agreement under the WTO covering trade in services 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – sub-agreement under the WTO covering trade in goods 
GDP, GNI 
Gross Domestic Product – a measure of a nation’s value added. 
Today, GNI (Gross National Income) is now more commonly 
used and this includes income from residents abroad. 
GSP Generalized System of Preferences 
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project – database and simulation model for international trade analysis, based at Purdue University, USA
HAI Human Asset Index – measure used as a criterion for making the list of Least Developed Countries 
HIGHINC Sometimes used as abbreviation for High Income Countries 
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
HS Harmonised System – classification system for tariffs and trade. There are different (HS1988, HS1996 and HS2002).  
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – another name for the World Bank 
IDA 
International Development Association – part of the World Bank 
supplying loans to the poorest countries. In this project, IDA 
frequently refers to the list of countries qualifying for IDA 
borrowing terms (currently 81 countries) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
LDC Least Developed Countries (note that some years ago, the abbreviation LLDC was common) 
LDC-GSP GSP tariffs applying to the Least Developed Countries 
LIC Low Income Country (used here, not generally applied) 
LICUS Low Income Countries Under Stress (World Bank terminology related to poor countries in conflict etc.) 
LLDC Landlocked Developing Countries (note: LLDC was formerly
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used as an abbreviation for Least Developed Countries) 
LMC Low and Middle Income Countries, according to World Bank classification 
MFA 
Multi-Fibre Agreement – standard nickname on the GATT 
“Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles”. In the 
1960s, there were cotton agreements, and with MFA in the 
1970s, other fibres were included – hence the nickname 
MFN 
Most Favoured Nation – i.e. used for trade rules that apply 
equally to different countries, as opposed to preferential trade 
rules 
MFN-WTO Used for MFN trade rules for WTO members, when some country has other rules for non-WTO members 
NOK Norwegian Kroner (currency) 
OA Official Aid – OECD DAC category for countries not included in the ODA list (see ODA) 
OCT 
Overseas Countries and Territories – 20 areas with a special 
relationship to the EU (mainly sparsely populated, some former 
colonies) 
ODA 
Official Development Assistance – term used for country 
classification with respect to aid; ODA countries exclude most 
high-income countries. The ODA group is defined by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECD24 
The first 24 members of the OECD (EU-15, USA, Canada, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, 
Turkey). Later members are Poland, Slovakia, Czech Rep., 
Hungary, Mexico, Korea. 
OJ Official Journal of the European Communities 
PRSP 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – document prepared in the 
World Bank process for aid and debt relief for the poorest 
countries 
PSE Producer Subsidy Equivalents – measure of total support, used particularly in agriculture 
RO Rules of origin 
SACU Southern African Customs Union, involves South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
SDT Special and Differential Treatment – term used for favourable provisions for developing countries in the WTO 
SIDS Small Island Developing States 
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SITC Standard International Trade Classification 
TRAINS Trade and tariff database from UNCTAD 
TRQ 
Tariff Rate Quotas – particularly used in agriculture, implies e.g. 
that tariffs are zero or reduced up to some quota (quantitative 
ceiling) and higher if the quantity exceeds this limit 
UMC Sometimes used as an abbreviation for Upper Middle Income Countries 
UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations’ Conference on Trade and Development 
UR 
The Uruguay Round that led to the creation of WTO (World 
Trade Organization), i.e. a multilateral negotiation round under 
the GATT 
WITS 
World Integrated Trade Solution – software for retrieving and 
using trade and tariff data, supplied by the World Bank and 
UNCTAD 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 
 
Norsk petro-power og terrorisme: Brennbart og brukbart red-
skap i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk?
Economic Voting and Support for EU Membership in Norway. A 
Time Series Analysis 
EUs forslag til nytt tjenestedirektiv: Samfunns- og næringsøko-
nomiske konsekvenser for Norge 
Norway’s Fredskorpset Youth Program: Study of selected ex-
change projects
Indigenous to Indigenous Cooperation. Review of the Saami 
Council Projects in Africa
Power, Principles and Procedures. Reinterpreting French foreign 
policy towards the USA (2001–2003)
Hva gjør Norge utsatt for terrorisme? Trusselscenarier og norsk 
sårbarhetsforvaltning
The German ICT industry. Spatial employment and innovation 
patterns
The Congo war and the prospects of state formation. Rwanda 
and Uganda compared
Demokratene og utformingen av amerikansk utenrikspolitikk
Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth Groups
‘A house of  straw, sticks or bricks’? Some notes on corruption 
empirics 
Corruption in China and Russia compared. Different legacies of 
central planning
Norges tollpreferanser for import fra u-land
The future of Norway’s GSP system
2004
Nr. 667
No. 668
No. 669
No. 670
No. 671
No. 672
2005
Nr. 673
No. 674
No. 675
Nr. 676
Nr. 677
No. 678
No. 679
Nr. 680a
No. 680b
Christian-Marius 
Stryken
Leo A. Grünfeld
Ulf Sverdrup
Leo A. Grünfeld
Axel Borchgrevink  To-
rild Skard
Axel Borchgrevink
Pernille Rieker
Signe Astrup Arnesen
Tore Bjørgo 
Morten Bremer Mærli
Björn Frank 
Per Botolf Maurseth
Stein S. Eriksen 
Svein Melby
Tore Bjørgo 
Yngve Carlsson
Jens C.  Andvig
Jens C.  Andvig
Arne Melchior
Arne Melchior
Notater |  Papers | 2004 – 2005
Publikasjoner fra NUPI
Internasjonal politikk kommer ﬁ re ganger i året og er det fremste tidsskriftet i 
Norden på sitt område. Når store begivenheter endrer det internasjonale landskapet, når skillene mel-
lom nasjonal og internasjonal politikk viskes gradvis ut eller når norsk utenrikspolitikk endres, ønsker 
Internasjonal politikk å være helt i front med å utforske denne utviklingen. Tidsskriftet publiserer fagar-
tikler, debatt og essays både fra Norge og nabolandene.
I 2004/05 har vi så langt brakt artikler om bl.a. USA – imperium eller hegemon?, Kyoto – et mislykket 
prosjekt?, Afrikanske konﬂ ikter,  Westfalermyten, Ikkespredning, nordisk sikkerhetssamarbeid og kon-
ﬂ iktløsning i Sudan samt et dobbeltnummer om Norge i 100 år etter unionsoppløsningen. 
Abonnement: NOK 360 | abonnement utenfor Norden: NOK 480 | løssalg: NOK 95 porto/postal charge 
Nordisk Øst·forum kommer ﬁ re ganger i året og er det ledende skandinaviskspråklige 
tidsskriftet på sitt felt. Tidsskriftets ambisjon er å dekke politisk og samfunnsmessig utvikling i en 
region i stadig rask endring – Sentral- og Øst-Europa og det postsovjetiske området. Tidsskriftet 
publiserer fagartikler, essays og bokomtaler. Første nummer i 2005 er et temanummer om utviklingen i 
landene mellom et ekspanderende EU og Russland: Ukraina, Hviterussland og Moldova. Det innholder  
artikler av ledende nordiske eksperter på de tre landene og gi bakgrunn for blant annet den pågående 
krisen i Ukraina.
Fra og med nr 2 - 2005 vil Nordisk Øst·forum være fagfellevurdert. I dette nummeret ser vi  bl.a. på Euro-
parådets behandling av Tsjetsjenia-konﬂ ikten, skilsmissen mellom tsjekkere og slovaker, hviterussisk 
historieskrivning, FNs habitatagenda i en russisk kontekst og miljøreformer i Latvia.
Abonnement studenter: NOK 285 | abonnement privatpersoner: NOK 350 | institusjoner: NOK 470 
enkelthefter: NOK 115 porto/postal charge
Hvor hender det? er artikkelserien som – i konsentrert og forenklet form – gir deg 
økt innsikt i internasjonale spørsmål. I mange sammenhenger har vi behov for kortfattet framstilling 
av konﬂ ikter og samarbeid, prosesser, utfordringer og utviklingstrekk i det internasjonale samfunnet. 
HHD fyller dette behovet med sitt lett tilgjengelige format – 4 A4-sider, med 24 numre per årgang, 
pedagogisk tilrettelagt, utheving av stikkord, margspørsmål, bilder, kart og grafer. HHD ﬁ nner du også 
på Internett – nær 300 artikler fra tidligere årganger, men aldri inneværende årgang.
Gruppeabonnement (10 eller ﬂ ere): NOK 75/ab. | enkeltabonnement: NOK 270 | enkeltabonnement utenfor Norge: 370 
Forum for Development Studies har i mange år vært Norges ledende 
tidsskrift innenfor utviklingsforskning. I senere år har det mer systematisk henvendt seg til beslektede 
miljøer i Norden med sikte på å bli et Oslo-basert internasjonalt tidsskrift. Siktemålet er å forbedre 
kvaliteten på norsk og nordisk forskning på utvikling, nord–sør-forhold og bistand. Samtidig ønsker 
redaksjonen å formidle resultater fra forskningen og stimulere til debatt.
Forum kommer ut med to hefter i året (vår og høst) og utgis av Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt i 
samarbeid med Norsk Forening for Utviklingsforskning.
Abonnement: NOK 220 | abonnement utenfor Norden: NOK 300 | løssalg: NOK 120 porto/postal charge
For mer informasjon om publikasjonene: 
Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt  Postboks  8159 Dep. 0033 Oslo 
Tel.: [+47] 22 99 40 00 | Fax: [+47] 22 36 21 82 | Internett: www.nupi.no | E-post: pub@nupi.no
